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THE NEW YORK LAW ON ENCROACHMENTS
AND OBSTRUCTIONS UPON STREETS
AND HIGHWAYS
I.

S

THE RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC AND oF ABUTTING OWNERS IN
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS.

and highways were originally created for public
travel and transportation, and the public is, subject to
certain limitations, entitled to the unobstructed and uninterrupted use of the entire width thereof for such purposes.'
Any unreasonable use of, or any unlawful obstruction or
encroachment thereon, constitutes a public nuisance, and
may be abated by the proper 2authorities in the same manner
as any other public nuisance.
TREETS

;Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. Y. 79 (1858); Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y.
360, 14 N. E. 264 (1887); Cohen v. Mayor, etc. of New York, 113 N. Y. 532,
21 N. E. 700 (1889)-; Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. Y. 596, 28 N. E. 418 (1891);
Egerer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 130 N. Y. 108, 29 N. E. 95 (1891) ; Babbage
v. Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. .132 (1891); Buchholz v. N. Y. L. E. &
W. R. R., 148 N. Y. 640, 43 N. E. 76 (1896); Delaware L. & W. R. R. v.
City of Buffalo, 4 App. Div. 562, 38 N. Y. Supp. 510 (4th Dept. 1896), aff'd,
158 N. Y. 266, 53 N. E. 44 (1899) ; Deshong v. City of N. Y., 176 N. Y. 475,
68 N. E. 880 (1903) ; Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907) ;
Sweet v. Perkins, 196 N. Y. 482, 90 N. E. 50 (1909); City of N. Y. v. Rice,
198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N. Y.
495, 109 N. E. 577 (1915); Matter of McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 71, 150
N. E. 546 (1925) ; O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N. Y. 423, 428, 171 N. E.
694 (1930); Peterson v. City of N. Y., 260 N. Y. 156, 183 N. E. 280 (1932) ;
President, etc. of W. & W. T. v. People, 9 Barb. 161 (1850); Wells v. Interboro R. T. Co., 124 App. Div. 631, 109 N. Y. Supp. 231 (1st Dept. 1908);
Matter of People ex rel. Foot v. Gross, 137 App. Div. 77, 122 N. Y. Supp. 135
(2d Dept. 1910); Richards v. Citizens' W. S. Co., 140 App. Div. 206, 125 N. Y.
Supp. 216 (2d Dept. 1910); Sullivan Adv. Co. v. City of N. Y., 61 Misc. 425,
113 N. Y. Supp. 893 (1908); Broad Exch. Co. v. C. S. & B. Market, Inc., 117
Misc. 82, 191 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1921).
2 Davis v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 14 N. Y. 506 (1856); Congreve v. Smith,
18 N. Y. 79 (1858); People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188 (1863); Cook v. Harris, 61
N. Y. 448 (1875); Hume v. Mayor, 74 N. Y. 264 (1878); Driggs v. Phillips,
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"The ownership by the city of the fee of the land
in the streets is impressed with a trust to keep the
same open and for use as Such. The trust is publici
jurls, that is for the whole People of the state, and is
under the absolute control of the legislature; in which
body, as representing the People, is vested power to
govern and to regulate the use of the streets." 3
Whether a particular use of, or obstruction upon, a
street is an unreasonable one, is a question of fact depending
upon all the circumstances of the case; 4 the fact that an
encroachment or obstruction is such that there is sufficient
room to pass around it does not make it any the less a nuisance. 5 "Any contracting or narrowing of a highway is a
nuisance."
103 N. Y. 77, 8 N. E. 514 (1886) ; Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 14 N. E.
264 (1887); Cohen v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 113 N. Y. 532, 21 N. E. 700
(1889); Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. Y. 596, 28 N. E. 418 (1891); Babbage v.
Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132 (1891) ; People ex rel. Wooster v. Maher,
141 N. Y."330, 36 N. E. 396 (1894); Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280,
39 N. E. 373 (1895); Buchholz v. N. Y. L. & W. R. R., 148 N. Y. 640,
43 N. E. 76 (1896) ; Tinker v. N. Y. 0. & W. R. R., 157 N. Y. 312, 51 N. E.
1031 (1898); Village of Oxford v. Willoughby, ,181 N. Y. 155, 73 N. E. 677
(1905); Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907); City of
Buffalo v. D. L. & W. R. R., 190 N. Y. 84, 82 N. E. 513 (1907) ; City of N. Y.
v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; People ex rel. Hofeller v. Bpck,
193 App. Div. 262, 184 N. Y. Supp. 210 (4th Dept. 1920), aff'd, 230 N. Y. 608,
130 N. E. 913 (1921) ; Matter of Kahabka v. Schwab, 205 App. Div. 368, 199
N. Y. Supp. 551 (4th Dept. 1923), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 595, 142 N. E. 298 (1923) ;
Matter of McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 71, 148 N. E. 793 (1925); Van Wyck
v. Lent, 33 Hun 301 (2d Dept. 1884); Farrell v. City of N. Y., 20 N. Y. St.
Rep. 12, 5 N. Y. Supp. 672 (1888), aff'd, 52 Hun 611 (1st Dept. 1889) ; City
of N. Y. v. Thorley, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 19, 1901, p. 631, col. 1, affd, 73 App.
Div. 626, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1123 (1st Dept. 1902) ; City of N. Y. v. Knickerbocker
Tr. Co., 52 Misc. 222, 102 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1906), aff'd, 104 App. Div. 223,
93 N. Y. Supp. 937 (1st Dept. 1905); Wells v. I. R. T. Co., 124 App. Div.
631, 109 N. Y. Supp. 231 (1st Dept. 1908) ; Weisberg v. Eilenberg, 192 App.
Div. 194, 182 N. Y. Supp. 551 (1st Dept. 1920); Town of Mt. Pleasant v. City
of N. Y., 199 App. Div. 315, 192 N. Y. Supp. 102 (2d Dept. 1921); Allen v.
N. Y. C. R. R., 228 App. Div. 382, 239 N. Y. Supp. 140 (3d Dept. 1930);
Broad Exch. Co. v. C. S. & B. Market, Inc., 117 Misc. 82, 191 N. Y. Supp. 534
(1921).
3 City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 128, 91 N. E. 283 (1910).
4Hudson v. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553 (1871); Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y.
360, 14 N. E. 264 (1887); Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. Y. 596, 28 N. E. 418
(1891); Murphy v. Leggett, 164 N. Y. 121, 58 N. E. 42 (1900); Sweet v.
Perkins, 196 N. Y. 482, 90 N. E. 50 (1909).
5Van Wyck v. Lent, 33 Hun 301 (2d Dept. 1884); People ex rel.
Swan v. Doxsee, 136 App. Div. 400, 120 N. Y. Supp. 962 (2d Dept. 1910), aff'd,
198 N. Y. 605, 92 N. E. 1098 (1910).
6 President, etc. W. & W. T. v. People, 9 Barb. 161, 175 (N. Y. 1850).
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Owners and lessees of property abutting on a street or
highway are likewise entitled to have the same kept open and
unobstructed at all times for the purpose of egress from, and
access to, their properties, and for the proper circulation of
light and air.7 These rights8 are property rights within the
meaning of the constitution.
The right of the public to the free and uninterrupted use
of its streets and highways and the rights of abutting owners
to have the same kept open are, however, subject to the
rights of abutting owners to make such reasonable use of
the street in front of their premises as necessity demands,
and for such purposes to encroach upon or obstruct the same,
provided, however, that such use is reasonable and temporary. Such invasion of the rights of the public and abutting
owners is sanctioned on the ground of necessity.9
7 Kellinger v. 42nd St. R. R., 50 N. Y. 206 (1872); Story v. N. Y. El. Ry.,
90 N. Y. 122 (1882) ; Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264 (1887) ;
Abendroth v. M. R. R., 122 N. Y. 1, 25 N. E. 496 (1890); Kane v. N. Y.
El. Ry., 125 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 278 (1891) ; Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. Y. 596,
28 N. E. 418 (1891); Reining v. N. Y. L. & W. R. R., 128 N. Y. 157,
28 N. E. 640 (1891); Hughes v. M. E. R. R., 130 N. Y. 14, 28 N. E. 765
(1891); Egerer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 130 N. Y. 108, 29 N. E. 95 (1891);
Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903) ; Donahue v. Keystone
Gas Co., 181 N. Y. 313, 316, 73 N. E. 1108 (1905); Hatfield v. Straus, 189
N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907) ;-People exrel. Browning, King & Co. v. Stover,
145 App. Div. 259, 130 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dept. 1911), aff'd, 203 N. Y. 613,
96 N. E. 1126 (1911); People ex rel. City of N. Y. v. N. Y. R. R., 217 N. Y.
310, 112 N. E. 49 (1916) ; Matter of Scheibel v. O'Brien, 230 N. Y. 277, 281,
130 N. E. 293 (1921); McMillan v. Klaw & Erlanger Co., 107 App. Div. 407,
95 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dept. 1905) ; Matter of Sweet Mfg. Co. v. Van Der
Hoof, 137 App. Div. 492, 121 N. Y. Supp. 842 (4th Dept. 1910); Brown-Brand
Realty Co., Inc. v. Saks & Co., 126 Misc. 336, 214 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1925),
aff'd, 218 App. Div. 827 (1st Dept. 1926) ; Decker v. Goddard, 233 App. Div.
139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dept. 1931) ; Lavery v. Hannigan, 20 J. & S.
463 (N. Y. 1885); Broad Exchange Co. v. C. S. & B. Market, Inc., 117 Misc.
82, 191 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1921); Mann v. Groom, 133 Misc. 260, 231 N. Y.
Supp. 342 (1937).
8 Story v. N. Y. El. Ry., 90 N. Y. 122 (1882); Abendroth v. M. R. Co.,
122 N. Y. 1, 25 N. E. 496 (1890); Kane v. N. Y. El. Ry., 125 N. Y. 164, 26
N. E. 278 (1891) ; Reining v. N. Y. L. & W. R. R., 128 N. Y. 157, 28 N. E.
640 (1891); Hughes v. M. E. R. R., 130 N. Y. 14, 28 N. E. 765 (1891);
Egerer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 130 N. Y. 108, 29 N. E. 95 (1891); Matter
of Rapid Transit R. R. Comm'rs, 197 N. Y. 81, 103, 90 N. E. 456 (1909);
Matter of Scheibel v. O'Brien, 230 N. Y. 277, 130 N. E. 293 (1921); McMillan
v. KIaw & Erlanger Co., 107 App. Div. 407, 95 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dept.
1905) ; Caldwell v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 111 App. Div. 164, 97 N. Y. Supp. 588
(1st Dept. 1906); Matter of Sweet Mfg. Co. v. Van Der Hoof, 137 App. Div.
492, 121 N. Y. Supp. 842 (4th Dept. 1910); Derrick v. State of N. Y., 117
Misc. 773, 776, 191 N. Y. Supp. 502 (1921).
9 People v. Horton, 64 N. Y. 610 (1876) ; Story v. N. Y. El. Ry., 90 N. Y.
122 (1882); Bliss v. Johnson, 94 N. Y. 235, 241 (1883); Welsh v. Wilson,
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"The primary purpose of streets is use by the
public for travel and transportation, and the general
rule is that any obstruction of a street or encroachment thereon which interferes with such use is a public nuisance. But there are exceptions to the general
rule born of necessity and justified by public convenience. An abutting owner engaged in building may
temporarily encroach upon the street by the deposit
of building materials. A tradesman may convey goods
in the street to and from his adjoining store. A coach
or omnibus may stop in the street to take up or set
down passengers, and the use of a street for public
travel may be temporarily interfered with in a variety
of other ways without the creation of what in the law
is deemed to be a nuisance. But all such interruptions
and obstructions of streets must be justified by necessity. It is not sufficient, however, that the obstructions are necessary with reference to the business of
him who erects or maintains them. They must also
be reasonable with reference to the rights of the public who have interests in the streets which may not be
sacrificed or disregarded. Whether an obstruction in
the street is necessary and reasonable must generally
be a question of fact to be determined upon the evidence relating thereto." 10
101 N. Y. 254, 4 N. E. 633 (1886); Dubois v. City of Kingston, 102 N. Y.
219, 6 N. E. 273 (1886); Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264
(1887) ; Cohen v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 113 N. Y. 532, 21 N. E. 700 (1889) ;
Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. Y. 596, 28 N. E. 418 (1891) ; Babbage v. Powers, 130
N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132 (1891) ; Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280, 39 N. E.
373 (1895); Tinker v. N. Y. 0. & W. R. R., 157 N. Y. 312, 51 N. E. 1031
(1898) ; Murphy v. Leggett, 164 N.* Y. 121, 58 N. E. 42 (1900) ; Sweet v.
Perkins, 196 N. Y. 482, 90 N. E. 50 (1909); Lyman v. Village of Potsdam,
228 N. Y. 398, 127 N. E. 312 (1920); O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253
N. Y. 423, 428, 171 N. E. 684 (1930); O'Reilly v. L. I. R. R., 4 App. Div. 139,
38 N. Y. Supp. 779 (1st Dept. 1896); People ex rel. Thompson v. Brookfield,
6 App. Div. 398, 39 N. Y. Supp. 673 (1st Dept. 1896) ; People ex rel. Comatus
v. Willis, 9 App. Div. 214, 41 N. Y. Supp. 168 (2d Dept. 1896); Tubesing v.
City of Buffalo, 51 App. Div. 14, 64 N. Y. Supp. 399 (4th Dept. 1900) ; Kelly
v. Otterstedt, 80 App. Div. 398, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (2d Dept. 1903); Odell
v. Bretney, 62 App. Div. 595, 71 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1st Dept. 1901) ; Odell v.
Bretney, 38 Misc. 603, 78 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1902), modified, 93 App. Div. 607
(1st Dept. 1904) ; Town of Albion v. Ryan, 201 App. Div. 719, 194 N. Y. Supp.
261 (4th Dept. 1922) ; Allen v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 228 App. Div. 382, 239 N. Y.
Supp. 140 (3d Dept. 1930).
10 Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 365, 14 N. E. 264 (1887).
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"That which would but slightly inconvenience the
public in one place, might in another very seriously
impede and discommode travelers. The use by a merchant of a back street but little travelled might be
reasonable and justified, while a like use of a main
thoroughfare constantly crowded with passing people
would become at once unreasonable and a nuisance
that could not be tolerated." I'
The right to obstruct the sidewalk temporarily with skids
for the purpose of removing cases of merchandise from a
store to a truck has been upheld as being a reasonable use. 12
But where a merchant obstructed the sidewalk by loading
and unloading merchandise on and from trucks placed in
the street by means of skids forming a bridge from the stoop
of his property over the sidewalk to the trucks, and the skids
and trucks remained in such position over the sidewalk from
four to five hours every day, it was held that this was an
unreasonable use of the street. "Such an extensive and continuous use of the sidewalk cannot be justified. It was a
practical appropriation by the defendant of the sidewalk in
front of his store to his private use in disregard of the public
convenience. Even if in some sense such use was necessary
to the convenient and profitable transaction of his business,
and if the obstruction was no more and even less than it
would be by any other method of doing business, these circumstances do not justify the obstruction. If the defendant
cannot transact his extensive business at that place without
thus encroaching, upon, obstructing and almost appropriating the sidewalk during the business hours of the day, he
must either remove his business to some other place or enlarge his premises so as to accommodate it. It was incumbent
on the defendant to show, not only that the use he made of
the sidewalk was necessary in his business, but also that it
was reasonable in reference to the public convenience. That
it was unreasonable is too clear for dispute. He might use
the bridge to load or unload a single truck, and this he could
do at intervals during the day, at no time obstructing the
11
12

Murphy v. Leggett, 164 N. Y. 121, 126, 58 N. E. 42 (1900).
Welsh v. Wilson, 101 N. Y. 254, 4 N4. E. 633 (1886).
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street for any considerable length of time. But there is no
authority and no rule of law which would warrant such an
obstruction daily for hours, or even one hour continuously." 13
The obstruction of streets by carriages in front of hotels
for the convenience of patrons has been declared to be a
legitimate use of the streets, it being held that carriages in
front of private residences, hotels, clubs, theatres, churches
and the like are necessary and do not unreasonably obstruct
the street.1 4 Such use of the street for carriages must not,
however, become so unreasonable as to constitute a nuisance
and interfere with the rights of the public in the use of the
street.15
The maintenance of a spur railroad track running from
the street to the property of an abutting owner, connecting
with the tracks of a street railway running through the street,
and the running of express cars thereon for the conveyance
of merchandise, is an unreasonable use of the street and
will not be sanctioned, 16 even though the municipal authori17 A glass and iron canopy
ties authorized and permitted it.
projecting from a garage over the sidewalk,' 8 a wooden platform, 19 an awning extending over a street, 20 permanent gaso13 Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 369, 14 N. E. 264 (1887); see
Kurlanchick v. Sklamberg, 56 Misc. 473, 107 N. Y. Supp. 117 (1907).
14 People ex rel. Thompson v. Brookfield, 6 App. Div. 398, 39 N. Y. Supp.
673 (1st Dept. 1896) ; Odell v. Bretney, 62 App. Div. 595, 71 N. Y. Supp. 449
(1st Dept. 1901); Odell v. Bretney, 38 Misc. 603, 78 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1902),
modified, 93 App. Div. 607 (1st Dept. 1904); Willis Cab & Auto Co. v. Abbaye,
67 Misc. 568, 124 N. Y. Supp. 756 (1910).
15 Odell v. Bretney, 62 App. Div. 595, 71 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1st Dept. 1901);
Odell v. Bretney, 38 Misc. 603, 78 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1902), inodified, 93 App.
Div. 607 (1st Dept. 1904). As to the right of the City to establish public hack
stands and the reasonable use thereof, see Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co. v. City
of N. Y., 212 N. Y. 97, 105 N. E. 803 (1914).
16 Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907); Matter of Sweet
Mfg. Co. v. Van Der Hoof, 137 App. Div. 492, 121 N. Y. Supp. 842 (4th
Dept. 1910).
2 Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907).
IsLongshore v. Albany Garage Co., 253 App. Div. 775 (3d Dept, 1937),
aff'd, 278 N. Y. 562, 16 N. E. (2d) 103 (1938).
29 Pukel v. Botwin, 242 App. Div. 543, 275 N. Y. Supp. 780 (1st Dept.
1934).
20 Farrell v. City of N. Y., 20 N. Y. St. Rep. 12, 5 N. Y. Supp. 672 (1888),
aff'd, 52 Hun 611 (5th Dept. 1889); Mansfield v. City of N. Y., 119 App. Div.
199, 104 N. Y. Supp. 386 (lst Dept. 1907); Brinkman v. Eisler, 40 N. Y. St.
Rep. 865, 16 N. Y. Supp. 154 (1891).
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line pumps at the curb,2 a coal hole, 22 a bridge across a
street, 23 a water faucet projecting four inches from a wall
at a distance of about six inches above the sidewalk, 24 the
storing of a wagon in the street,25 parking an automobile
thereon, 2 6 maintaining a

show case on the sidewalk, 27 a

2s

and even a peanut roaster 2 and a
weighing machine,
herring stand,3 0 have been held to be nuisances. On the
other hand, the erection and maintenance of a stepping stone
near the edge of the curb, 31 a pile of rubbish temporarily
placed at the side of a street on "clean up" day for carting
away, 32 and gate posts which did not obstruct the maintravelled part of the street, 33 have been held not to be
nuisances.
Under the Administrative Code of the City of New York,
the city is empowered to permit and to license specified obstructions,3 4 and while the legislature has the power to confer such authority upon municipalities, it is important to
ascertain, in each particular case, whether such authority
has, in fact, been conferred. As an illustration, the decision
holding that permanent gasoline pumps at the curb were a
nuisance,3 5 was based upon the fact that authority to license
21 Matter of Kahabka v. Schwab, 205 App. Div. 368, 199 N. Y. Supp. 551
(4th Dept. 1923), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 595, 142 N. E. 298 (1923) ; Matter of Orrin
Realty Corp. v. Addyman, 235 App. Div. 732 (2d Dept. 1932).
22 Clifford v. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52 (1880); Deitz v. Hilman Realty Co., 201
App. Div. 370, 194 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1st Dept. 1922).
23 Knox v. Mayor, etc. of City of N. Y., 55 Barb. 404 (N. Y. 1868).
24
Saphir v. Child's Co., Inc., 243 App. Div. 636 (2d Dept. 1935).
25 Cohen v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 113 N. Y. 532, 21 N. E. 700 (1889).
26 Decker v. Goddard, 233 App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dept.
1931); Mann v. Groom, 133 Misc. 260, 231 N. Y. Supp. 342 (1927).
27 Wells v. City of Brooklyn, 9 App. Div. 61, 41 N. Y. Supp. 143 (2d
Dept. 1896), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 699, 53 N. E. 1133 (1899); Wells v. City of
Brooklyn, 45 App. Div. 623 (2d Dept. 1899); People v. New York, 18 Abb.
N. C. 123 (N. Y. 1885).
28Drake v. Corning Building Co., Inc., 241 App. Div. 586, 272 N. Y. Supp.
726 (4th Dept. 1934).
29 Frank v. Village of Warsaw, 198 N. Y. 463, 92 N. E. 17 (1910).
20 Weisberg v. Eilenberg, 192 App. Div. 194, 182 N. Y. Supp. 551 (1st
Dept.31 1920).
Dubois v. City of Kingston, 102 N. Y. 219, 6 N. E. 273 (1886) ; Robert
v. Powell,
168 N. Y. 411, 61 N. E. 699 (1901).
3
2 Lyman v. Village of Potsdam, 228 N. Y. 398, 127 N. E. 312 (1920).
33McCloskey v. Buckley, 223 N. Y. 187, 119 N. E. 395 (1918).
3
4 Matter of Topoozian v. Geraghty, 239 App. Div. 458, 267 N. Y. Supp.
598 2(2d Dept. 1933).
1 Matter of Kahabka v. Schwab, 205 App. Div. 368, 199 N. Y. Supp. 551
(4th Dept. 1923), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 595, 142 N. E. 298 (1923); see Matter of
Orrin Realty Corp. v. Addyman, 235 App. Div. 732 (2d Dept. 1932).
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such pumps had not been conferred upon the city of Buffalo
36
by its charter, In a similar case, decided two years later,
it was held that the charter of the Village of Peekskill did
authorize the municipal officers to license gasoline pumps at
the curb and that, consequently, they were not a nuisance.
The determining factor is whether the use of the street or
the obstruction thereon is reasonable, temporary and necessary, or, if the obstruction is permanent, whether such use is
a public, as distinguished from a private, use. "The public
right to the unobstructed use of a street in all its parts is
not absolute but relative. The right may be qualified by
means of permanent obstructions located at the sides of the
streets, fulfilling useful public purposes consistent with, although other than, those of transportation and traffic, provided unobstructed passageways of ample width are left,
***
and provided; further, the obstructions are not in the
nature of permanent structures or encroachments upon and
appropriations of the land of the street for private benefit
or use. * * * The right may be qualified also by the use, temporary and for a reasonable time, of the sidewalk and side
of the street, by an abutting owner, to fulfill a reasonable
necessity. This right is founded upon common usage and
consent and needs no other authority. It cannot be exercised so as to interfere unreasonably with the public right.
* * * This use cannot be permanent and continuous, even if
sanctioned by the unauthorized consent of the municipal
authorities." 37
If the authorities whose duty it is to remove unlawful obstructions or encroachments refuse or neglect to do so, mandamus will lie on behalf of a citizen to compel them to do
their duty and remove the same,38 on the theory that a citi31Matter of, McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 7i, 148 N. E. 793 (1925).
3 Lyman v. Village of Potsdam, 228 N. Y. 398, 404, 127 N. E. 312 (1920).
38 People ex rel. Wooster v. Maher, 141 N. Y. 330, 36 N. E. 396 (1894) ;
People ex rel. Swan v. Doxsee, 136 App. Div. 400, 120 N. Y. Supp. 962 (2d
Dept. 1910), aff'd, 198 N. Y. 605, 92 N. E. 1098 (1910); Southern Leasing
Co. v. Ludwig, 217 N. Y. 100, 104, 111 N. E. 470 (1916); People ex rel.
Hofeller v. Buck, 193 App. Div. 262, 184 N. Y. Supp. 210 (4th Dept. 1920),
aff'd, 230 N. Y. 608, 130 N. E. 913 (1921); Matter of Kababka v. Schwab,
205 App. Div. 368, 199 N. Y. Supp. 551 (4th Dept. 1923), af'd, 236 N. Y. 595,
142 N. E. 298 (1923); Blanshard v. City of N. Y., 262 N. Y. 5, 15, 186 N. E.
29 (1933) ; People ex rel. Comatus v. Willis, 9 App. Div. 214, 41 N. Y. Supp.
168 (2d Dept. 1896) ; People er rel. Butler v. Hawxhurst, 123 App. Div. 65,
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zen can enforce a right in which the general public is interested 39 where such interest is common to the whole comintermeddle in a matter
munity, and he does not officiously
40
with which he has no concern.
"The right to relief by mandamus unquestionably rests
in the discretion of the court",' but it "is elementary law
that the public is entitled to the free and unobstructed use
of city streets and that any obstruction of such streets for

private use interferes with the public right, constitutes a
nuisance and may be removed at the suit of any interested
citizen. There are certain exceptions to this general statement, as where there are temporary obstructions or obstructions which the courts have considered as not amounting to
a substantial interference with traffic and as permissible
and not in conflict with the purposes for which streets and
4 2
highways are maintained."

Mandamus will not be granted, however, unless the obstruction is patently a public nuisance and the duty of the

municipal officers to remove the same is clear and unquestionable. Where a citizen demanded that the borough presi-

dent be directed to remove the poles and wires of an electric
company from the streets on the ground that the electric
company had no franchise to use the streets, relief was denied for the reason that "mandamus can be granted only
where there is a clear, legal duty imposed upon a public
officer. In etery instance where the writ has been granted
107 N. Y. Supp. 746 (2d Dept. 1907); People ex rel. Cross Co. v. Ahearn, 124
App. Div. 840, 109 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1st Dept. 1908) ; People ex rel. Smith v.
Mosier, 134 App. Div. 4, 118 N. Y. Supp. 95 (4th Dept. 1909); People ex rel.
Foot v. Gross, 137 App. Div. 77, 122 N. Y. Supp. 135 (2d Dept. 1910); People
ex rel. Ackerman v. Stover, 138 App. Div. 237, 122 N. Y. Supp. 1030 (1st
Dept. 1910); People ex rel. Minard v. Donovan, 228 App. Div. 596, 240 N. Y.

Supp. 766 (3d Dept. 1930) ; Bee Line, Inc. v. La Guardia, 244 App. Div. 151,
155, 279 N. Y. Supp. 274 (2d Dept. 1935) ; Pounds v. Lee Ave. Theatre Co.,
84 Misc. 623, 147 N. Y. Supp. 815 (1914); Matter of Carmody v. City of
Elmira, 160 Misc. 916, 917, 290 N. Y. Supp. 1021 (1936).
-9 People ex rel. Pumpyamsky v. Keating, 168 N. Y. 390, 393, 61 N. E. 637
(1901) ; Daurizio v. Merchants D. T. Co., 152 Misc. 716, 718, 274 N. Y. Supp.
174 (1934).
40 People v. Halsey, 37 N. Y. 344, 348 (1867).
41 Matter of Kahabka v. Schwab, 205 App. Div. 368, 371, 199 N. Y. Supp.
551 (4th Dept. 1923), affd, 236 N. Y. 595, 142 N. E. 298 (1923).
42 People ex rel. Hofeller v. Buck, 193 App. Div. 262, 264, 184 N. Y. Supp.
210 (4th Dept. 1920), aff'd, 230 N. Y. 608, 130 N. E. 913 (1921); see Matter
of Kahabka v. Schwab, 205 App. Div. 368, 199 N. Y. Supp. 551 (4th Dept.
1923), af'd, 236 N. Y. 595, 142 N. E. 298 (1923).
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* * * there has been a single structure, the presence of which
could not be sanctioned under the statutes and ordinances.
Little analogy can be discovered between those cases and the
present case, which' involves a whole system of electric light
poles and wires erected and maintained pursuant to franchises granted by the legislative body of the municipality
under a claim of power and authority so to do." 4
In an application by a citizen and taxpayer for a peremptory mandamus order to compel the removal of a stoop and
a bay window which encroached upon the street, the order
was denied for the reason that the encroachment was not
shown to be a public nuisance, and the owner of the property was not made a party to the proceeding so that he could
be heard on the question of nuisance, the court saying: "No
such order can be sustained without the presence of the
owner in court. The city may at all times abate a public
nuisance. No decree of the court is required. But this power
rests upon the fact that a public nuisance does exist. So,
too, when the official is negligent, the court doubtless may
by mandamus compel him to do his duty. It will not require him to interfere with private property, however, unless concededly it is a nuisance or unless the owner has an
opportunity to be heard upon the subject." After stating
that the city cannot alienate any part of its streets or permit
permanent encroachments thereon, but that the most it can
do is to give a revocable license, the court continued: "A
revocable license, however, is a different matter. For many
years the streets have been bounded by a so-called building
line. * * * For many years also some private use of street
areas has been permitted. Stoops, steps, areaways, cellar
openings, vaults, awnings, bay windows, cornices connected
with adjoining buildings, and not unreasonably interfering
with traffic, have all existed. As they must be removed on
4 Southern Leasing Co. v. Ludwig, 217 N. Y. 100, 111 N. E. 470 (1916);
Bankers Tr. Co. v. City of Yonkers, 255 App. Div. 173, 178, 6 N. Y. S. (2d)
883 (2d Dept. 1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y. 244, 21 N. E. (2d) 514 (1939) ; Matter
of Clements, 191 App. Div. 279, 281, 181 N. Y. Supp. 230 (2d Dept. 1920).
As to the right of a citizen to maintain a mandamus proceeding generally,
see Blanshard v. City of N. Y., 262,N. Y. 5, 186 N. E. 29 (1933); Bee Line,
Inc. v. La Guardia, 244 App. Div. 151, 155, 279 N. Y. Supp. 274 (2d Dept.
1935) ; Matter of Carmody, v. City of Elmira, 160 Misc. 916, 917, 290 N. Y.
Supp. 1021 (1936).
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demand of the city in actions for specific performance, the
existence of many have been held to make the title to the
adjoining building unmarketable; but their presence has not
been supposed to create a public nuisance whose removal
would be compelled by the courts at the instance of any
taxpayer." 44
Although negligence actions are beyond the scope of this
article, many of the cases involving street obstructions arise
in actions for damages for personal injuries sustained because of an obstruction or encroachment, and the law of negligence-whether the obstruction was a public nuisance and
whether it was the proximate cause of the accident-is the
deciding factor. If the obstruction is found to be a public
nuisance, there will usually be no question as to the right of
the injured person to recover; but even where the obstruction is not a nuisance per se, a jury may find that the use of
the street was unreasonable and award damages to a plaintiff.
Hence, an iron platform two feet high and five feet wide
wholly within the stoop line, was held not to be a nuisance
per se, but a person who was injured by slipping on the steps
of the platform was held to be entitled to recover damages
because the jury found that the use of the platform and the
45
sidewalk was unreasonable.

II.

RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE AND THE
MUNICIPAUTIES To AUTHORIZE ENCROACHMENTS
AND OBSTRUCTIONS.

The legislature has the sole and absolute control over all
streets and highways and it is vested with the power to govern and regulate their use. 46 This power is, however, limited.
44 Matter of Green v. Miller, 249 N. Y. 88, 91, 94, 162 N. E. 593 (1928) ;
see People ex rel. Neary Memorials, Inc. v. Harvey, 242 App. Div. 831 (2d
Dept. 1934); People ex rel. Simon v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 20 Misc. 189, 45
N. Y. Supp. 900 (1897); Matter of Langley, 140 Misc. 203, 250 N. Y. Supp.
124 45
(1928).
Murphy v. Leggett, 164 N. Y. 121, 58 N. E. 42 (1900).
46 Wager v. Troy U. P, L,25 N. Y. 526 (1862); People v. Kerr, 27
N. Y. 188 (1863); Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611 (1863); Coster v. Mayor of
Albany, 43 N. Y. 399 (1871); Kellinger v. 42nd St., etc. R. R., 50 N. Y. 206
(1872) ; Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N: Y. 132, 29 N. E. 85 (1891) ; Potter v. Collis,
156 N. Y. 16, 50 N. E. 413 (1898); D. L. & W. H. R.v. City of Buffalo, 4
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The legislature cannot authorize or consent to the erection
and maintenance of substantial and permanent encroachments or obstructions on the streets or highways, or an unreasonable use thereof which would seriously invade the
rights of the public or of abutting owners.4 7 This limitation
exists by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution which
prohibit the taking of private property without compensation
or for other than a public purpose. As previously pointed
out, the rights of owners of property abutting on a highway
are property rights, and an attempt by the legislature to
authorize the erection and maintenance of permanent and
substantial encroachments on such highways by one person
to the detriment of another, would diminish the latter's right
of free access to and from his property and interfere with his
easements of light and air. Such an act would constitute
the taking of property without compensation and for other
than a public purpose. It would also be an invasion of the
public right and4 8 an appropriation of public property for a
private purpose.
Although the legislature has no power to permit permanent and substantial encroachments, it may authorize such
temporary and unsubstantial obstructions and encroachments
App. Div. 562, 38 N. Y. Supp. 510 (4th Dept. 1896), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 266,
53 N. E. 44 (1899) ; Rochester & L. 0. Water Co. v. City of Rochester, 176
N. Y. 36, 68 N. E. 117 (1903) ; Matter of Rhinehardt v. Redfield, 93 App. Div.
410, 87 N. Y. Supp. 789 (2d Dept. 1904), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 569, 68 N. E. 1118
(1904) ; City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910); Bradley v.
Degnon Contracting Co., 224 N. Y. 60, 67, 120 N. E. 89 (1918); Matter of
McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 71, 148 N. E. 283 (1925) ; Decker v. Goddard, 233
App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dept. 1931).
47 Story v. N. Y. El. Ry., 90 N. Y. 122 (1882) ; Kane v. N. Y. El. Ry.,
125 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 278 (1891) ; Egerer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 130
N. Y. 108, 29 N. E. 95 (1891) ; Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629
(1903); Deshong v. City of N. Y., 176 N. Y. 475, 68 N. E. 880 (1903); City
of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910); Matter of McCoy v.
Apgar, 241 N. Y. 71, 148 N. E. 283 (1910) ; People ex rel. Cross Co. v. Ahearn,
124 App. Div. 840, 104 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1st Dept. 1901).
48 Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 358 (1852); Gould v. H. R. R., 6 N. Y. 522
(1852) ; Wager v. Troy U. R. R., 25 N. Y. 526 (1862) ; Story v. N. Y. El. Ry.,
90 N. Y. 122 (1882); Mahady v. B. R. R., 91 N. Y. 148 (1883); Abendroth v.
M. R. R., 122 N. Y. 1, 25 N. E. 496 (1890); Kane v. N. Y. El. Ry., 125 N. Y.
164, 26 N. E. 278 (1891) ; Galway v. M. E. R. R., 128 N. Y. 132, 28 N. E. 479
(1891); Reining v. N. Y. L. & W. R. R., 128 N. Y. 157, 28 N. E. 640
(1891); Egerer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R, 130 N. Y. 108, 29 N. E. 278 (1891);
Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903) ; Matter of Sweet Mfg.
Co. v. Van Der Hoof, 137 App. Div. 492, 121 N. Y. Supp. 842 (4th Dept.
1910).
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as will not seriously affeet the rights of the public or of abutting owners.4 9 "But it is competent for the legislature to authorize a limited use of sidewalks in front of buildings in
cities and villages for stoops or cellar openings, or underground vaults, for the convenience and beneficial enjoyment
of the adjacent premises. While such use may restrict somewhat the free and uninterrupted use of the streets for pedestrians, the general interests are subserved by making available to the greatest extent valuable property, increasing business facilities, giving encouragement to improvements and

adding to taxable values." 50
The power of the legislature to govern and regulate the
use of streets and highways, to permit temporary encroachments thereon, and to prevent and remove encroachments
therefrom, may be delegated to the municipalities.5 1 Such
delegation of authority will not, however, be implied, but
must rest upon express legislation containing a clear and un5 2
qualified grant of power.
The powers and the authority of the city of New York
49 Dubois v. City of Kingston, 102 N. Y. 219, 6 N. E. 273 (1886) ; Hoey v.
Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132, 29 N. E. 85 (1891); Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y.
280, 39 N. E. 373 (1895) ; Donnelly v. City of Rochester, 166 N. Y. 315, 318,
59 N. E. 989 (1901); Robert v. Powell, 168 N. Y. 411, 61 N. E. 699 (1901);
Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907) ; City of N. Y. v. Rice,
198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co., 224
N. Y. 60, 68, 70, 120 N. E. 89 (1918); Lyman v. Village of Potsdam, 228
N. Y. 398, 127 N. E. 312 (1920); Matter of McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 71,
148 N. E. 793 (1925) ; Matter of Green v. Miller, 249 N. Y. 88, 162 N. E. 593
(1928); Kiernan v. Newton, 20 Abb. N. C. 398 (N. Y. 1887); Decker v.
Goddard, 233 App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dept. 1931).
50 Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280, 284, 39 N. E. 373 (1895).
01 Wager v. Troy Union R. R., 25 N. Y. 526 (1862) ; People v. Kerr, 27
N. Y. 188 (1863) ; Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132, 29 N. E. 85 (1891) ; Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280, 39 N. E. 373 (1895) ; Potter v. Collis, 156 N. Y.
16, 50 N. E. 413 (1898); Rochester & L. 0. W. Co. v. City of Rochester,
176 N. Y. 36, 68 N. E. 117 (1903) ; Matter of Rhinehardt v. Redfield, 93 App.
Div. 410, 87 N. Y. Supp. 789 (2d Dept. 1904), aft'd, 179 N. Y. 569, 68 N. E.
1118 (1904); Village of Carthage v. C. N. Y. T. & T. Co., 185 N. Y. 448,
78 N. E. 165 (1906); City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283
(1910); People ex rel. City of N. Y. v. N. Y. R. R., 217 N. Y. 310, 316,
91 N. E. 283 (1910); Matter of McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 71, 148 N. E.
283 (1925); Decker v. Goddard, 233 App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th
Dept. 1931); Economic Power Co. v. City of Buffalo, 59 Misc. 571, 111 N. Y.
Supp. 443 (1908), aff'd, 128 App. Div. 883 (4th Dept. 1908).
52 St. Vincent Orphan Asylum v. City of Troy, 76 N. Y. 108 (1879);
Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903) ; Village of Carthage v.
C. N. Y. T. & T. Co., 185 N. Y. 448, 78 N. E. 165 (1906) ; People ex tel. City
of N. Y. v. N. Y. R. R., 217 N. Y 310, 316, 112 N. E. 49 (1916); Matter of
McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 71, 148 N. E. 793 (1925).
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to govern and regulate the use of its streets are set forth
in the Charter and the Administrative' Code, both of which
contain numerous provisions respecting the rights and the
limitations of the city to regulate the use of its streets and to
permit encroachments and obstructions thereon. The two
most important provisions of the Charter, in the light of
which all other provisions must be considered, are those relating to the inalienability of the property of the city and
the right of the city to permit encroachments thereon. The
first declares that "the rights of the city in and to its water
front, ferries, wharf property,' bridges, land under water,
public landings, wharves, docks, streets, avenues, highways,
parks and all other public places" are inalienable, but that
"upon the closing or discontinuance of any street, avenue,
park or other public place the property may be sold or otherwise disposed of as may be provided by law, and leases of
land under water, wharf property, wharves, docks and piers
may be made as may be provided by law"; the right to grant
franchises, permits and licenses in respect to inalienable
property is not, however, prevented. 53 The other provision
states that the council "shall not pass any local law authorizing the placing or continuing of any encroachment or obstruction upon any street or sidewalk excepting temporary
occupation thereof during and for the purpose of the erection, repairing or demolition of a building on a lot abutting
thereon under revocable licenses therefor, and excepting the
erection of booths, stands or displays pr the maintenance of
sidewalk cafes under licenses to be granted only with the
consent of the owner of the premises if the same shall be
located in whole or in part within stoop lines." "
Other sections of the Charter relate to the issuance of
permits for renewing the pavement of streets, 55 the construction of pipes, conduits and tunnels under railroad tracks
upon and connecting bridges over streets, 56 the authority of
the commissioner of parks to regulate the use of and the
projections on streets in parks and public places and within
6' N. Y.

CITY CHAR

54M. § 42, subd. b.
55 Id. § 83.
56 Id. § 374.

§ 383.
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three hundred fifty feet therefrom, 57 and empower the borough presidents to remove incumbrances, to license vaults
under sidewalks, and to regulate the use or opening of
58

streets.
Under the Charter and the Administrative Code, the city
may also authorize such minor encroachments as columns,
pillars, ornamental projections, areaways, cellar doors,
stoops, awnings, signs and the like, and also permit the temporary deposit of building material in the streets. While
under the common law rules such encroachments were considered nuisances, they are nevertheless permitted in the city
for the reason that they are necessary and convenient and do
not materially interfere with the rights of the public. They
are permissible only and until such time as the necessities
of the public require their removal, and the city authorities
may at any time -revoke the permits or licenses theretofore
59
issued to maintain them.
"There can be no doubt that municipal authorities

having the care and control of the streets in a city
may authorize their temporary use by private parties
for private purposes to a limited extent. The precise
limits beyond which that power cannot be exercised

have not been very specifically or accurately defined
and perhaps cannot be. The governing body in a city
may permit private parties to deposit building materials in the streets, to construct and use coal holes,
cellarways, areas, vaults under sidewalks, awnings
Id. § 532.
5 Id. § 82.
59 Nolan v. King, 97 N. Y. 565 (1885); Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132,
29 N. E. 85 (1891); Babbage v. Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132 (1891);
Dougherty v. Village of Horseheads, 159 N. Y. 154, 53 N. E. 799 (1899);
Donnelly v. City of Rochester, 166 N. Y. 315, 59 N. E. 989 (1901); City of
N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; People ex rel. Comatus v.
Willis, 9 App. Div. 214, 41 N. Y. Supp. 168 (2d Dept. 1896) ; Tubesing v. City
of Buffalo, 51 App. Div. 14, 64 N. Y. Supp. 399 (4th Dept. 1900); Odell v.
Bretney, 62 App. Div. 595, 71 N. Y. Supp. 449 (1st Dept. 1901); Odell v.
Bretney, 38 Misc. 603, 78 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1902), modified, 93 App. Div. 607
(1st Dept. 1904); Lincoln Safe Dep. Co. v. City of N. Y., 96 App. Div. 624,
88 N. Y. Supp. 1039 (1st Dept. 1904); City of N. Y. v. U. S. Trust Co., 116
App. Div. 349, 101 N. Y. Supp. 574 (1st Dept. 1906) ; People ex rel. Cross Co.
v. Ahearn, 124 App. Div. 840, 109 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1st Dept. 1908); Kierman
v. Newtown, 20 Abb. N. C. 398 (N. Y. 1887); People ex rel. Simon v. Mayor,
20 Misc. 189, 45 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1897).
5
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above, and the like. But all these and similar uses
of the public streets for private use are either expressly
authorized by statute or sanctioned by the courts as
being exceptions to the general rule born of necessity
and justified by public convenience and custom." 60
The powers of the city under the new Charter and the
Administrative Code with respect to the licensing of vaults
and cellars under the streets, are similar to those contained
in the old Charter. The courts have held that under the old
Charter the city had the right to authorize the maintenance
of vaults and cellars under the streets, as such use did not
impair the right of the public to the use of the surface of
the streets.61 "I think it to be fairly clear that there is a
distinction between the right to permit the use of the subsoil
of a city street by an abutting owner and the right to permit
a permanent encroachment upon the street, by which the
absolute right of the People to the uninterrupted use thereof
may be diminished." 62 Such private use is, however, subject
and subordinate to the rights of the public, and a permit for
the maintenance of a vault may be revoked whenever the
public interest demands it. 63

"Whenever the existence of a

60 Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 214, 82 N. E. 172 (1907) ; see City of
N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; Tymon v. M. L. S. Constr.
Co., 262 N. Y. 161, 186 N. E. 425 (1933) ; Harmon v. City of N. Y., 148 App.
Div. 61, 131 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1st Dept. 1911).
61 New York Steam Co. v. Foundation Co., 123 App. Div. 254, 108 N. Y.
Supp. 84 (1st Dept. 1908), rev'd on other grounds, 195 N. Y. 43, 87 N. E. 765
(1909).
62 City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 131, 91 N. E. 283 (1910).
63 Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280, 39 N. E. 373 (1895) ; Deshong v.
City of N. Y., 176 N. Y. 475, 68 N. E. 880 (1903); Hatfield v. Straus, 189
N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907) ; City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E.
283 (1910); Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of N. Y., 210 N. Y. 34, 103
N. E. 768 (1913); Appleton v. City of N. Y., 163 App. Div. 680, 148 N. Y.
Supp. 870 (lst Dept. 1914), aff'd, 219 N. Y. 150, 114 N. E. 73 (1916) ; Matter
of Low, 233 N. Y. 334, 135 N. E. 521 (1922); Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v.
City of N. Y., 96 App. Div. 624 (1st Dept. 1904) ; Potter v. Interborough R. T.
Co., 54 Misc. 423, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1071 (1907), aff'd, 124 App. Div. 920 (lst
Dept. 1908); Linton v. Coupe, 138 App. Div. 518, 123 N. Y. Supp. 321 (2d
Dept. 1910).
Parish v. Baird, 160 N. Y. 302, 54 N. E. 724 (1899) and Lahr v. Met. El.
Ry., 104 N. Y. 268, 10 N. E. 528 (1887) are distinguished in Lincoln Safe
Deposit Co. v. City of N. Y., 210 N. Y. 34, 103 N. E. 768 (1913), where the
court said: "Reliance is placed by the plaintiff on a statement made in Parish
v. Baird (160 N. Y. 302, 54 N. E. 724 (1899)) *thatthe right to maintain vaults
is an easement. Whether an easement or not, the right is in some respects
similar to an easement and is property right as against any third party who may
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vault would interfere with the public use of the street, the
right to maintain it must be held to terminate, as the right
of individuals under such permits must be regarded as subordinate to the necessities or requirements of the public." 64
"A permit for the construction of a vault in a
public highway, for the use of the abutting owner, is
in the nature of a revocable private easement. It may
be revoked when the space is required for municipal
or other public purposes, but until revoked it may be
fully enjoyed. * * * The municipal authorities were
expressly authorized by the Legislature to grant the
right to the abutting owner to construct these vaults
and it has often been decided by the courts that the
construction of such vaults in a public street is a
proper use of the street and that the owner's rights
therein will be protected while the permit stands unrevoked." (r
An abutting owner, as such, has no inherent right to
build and maintain a vault under the street without first obtaining a permit from the city and paying the license fee
therefor. 6 "Maintaining the vaults without a permit is a
violation of the ordinance and constitutes a public nuisance
which the plaintiffs could be required to abate. * * * The
city owes a duty to the travelling public and to those lawviolate it. That was all the case presented. It did not involve the duration of
the privilege as against the public. Also attention is called to a statement
found in the opinion in the case of Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. (104
N. Y. 268, 10 N. E. 528 (1887)) that the right which the city of New York
acquired in the streets is limited to their use for street purposes. The opinion
did not receive the approval of a majority of the court and the excerpt quoted
is an inaccurate statement of the law."
64 Deshong v. City of N. Y., 176 N. Y. 475, 480, 68 N. E. 880 (1903).
65 N. Y. Steam Co. v. Foundation Co., 123 App. Div. 254, 262, 108 N. Y.

Supp. 84 (1st Dept. 1908), rev'd on other grounds, 195 N. Y. 43, 87 N. E. 765
(1909).
66 City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N. Y. 258, 100 N. E. 798 (1913);
Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. City of N. Y., 210 N. Y. 34, 103 N. E. 768 (1913) ;
Appleton v. City of N. Y., 163 App. Div. 680, 148 N. Y. Supp. 870 (1st Dept.
1914), aff'd, 219 N. Y. 150, 114 N. E. 73 (1916) ; see City of N. Y. v. Masten,
174 App. Div. 661, 161 N. Y. Supp. 196 (1st Dept. 1916), aff'd, 223 N. Y. 638,
119 N. E. 1034 (1918); Matter of Low, 233 N. Y. 334, 135 N. E. 521 (1922);
Potter v. Interborough R..T. Co., 54 Misc. 423, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1071 (1907),
aff'd, 124 App. Div. 920 (1st Dept. 1908); City of N. Y. v. Gerry, 100 Misc.
297, 165 N. Y. Supp. 659 (1917).
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fully in occupation of any part of the subsurface of the streets
to exercise reasonable care to maintain the streets in a safe
condition. That duty requires the city to supervise the construction of vaults, and to inspect the same from time to
time, and to require that they be safely constructed and maintained; and regardless of whether the city does or does not
own the fee of the street, in permitting an abutting owner
to construct a vault under a street, the city has a right to
exact a reasonable fee to cover the expenses to which it will
be subjected in supervising the construction of the vaults
and in inspecting them, and in seeing that they are properly constructed and safely maintained." 67
The authority of municipalities to authorize the erection and maintenance of encroachments and obstructions
such as a storm door,0 8 an iron awning extending to the curb
and supported by posts at the curb line,0 9 a newsstand under
the steps of an elevated railroad station,7 0 and other like encroachments, have heretofore been sustained by the courts.
An ordinance was held valid which permitted the use of five
feet on each side of a street for courtyards and their enclosure by an iron fence, but the erection of a wall around the
courtyards was disapproved. 7 ' In another case, an ordinance
permitting fifteen feet of a street to be fenced in and maintained as a courtyard was also held valid,7 2 although the
earlier cases held that no such power resided in a munici73
pality.
An act of the legislature widening a street twenty feet
on each side and authorizing the abutting owners to fence in
the twenty-foot strip as and for courtyards was held constitutional, the court, saying: "It is not necessary that every
67 Appleton v. City of N. Y., 163 App. Div. 680; 691, 148 N. Y. Supp. 870

(1st Dept. 1914), aff'd, 219 N. Y. 150, 114 N. E. 73 (1916).
6s Kiernan v. Newton, 20 Abb. N. C. 398 (N. Y. 1887).
69 Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132, 29 N. E. 85 (1891).
70 People ex rel. Pumpyansky v. Keating, 168 N. Y. 390, 61 N. E. 637
(1901); People ex rel. Simon v. Mayor, 20 Misc. 189, 45 N. Y. Supp. 900
(1897).
71
Linton v. Coupe, 138 App. Div. 518, 123 N. Y. Supp. 321 (2d Dept.
1910).
72 People ex rel. Cross Co. v. Ahearn, 124 App. Div. 840, 109 N. Y. Supp.
249 (1st Dept. 1908).
73 Lawrence v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 2 Barb. 577 (N. Y. 1848) ; People
ex rel. O'Reilly v. Mayor, 59 How. Pr. 277 (N. Y. 1880); Ely v. Campbell,
59 How. Pr. 333 (N. Y. 1879).
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part of all highways should be used for the passage of vehicles and pedestrians; it is proper that some regard should
be had for the aesthetic tastes, the comfort, health and convenience of the public, and, if the Legislature had enacted
that Clinton Avenue should be increased in width to the extent provided in this act, and had provided that a strip in
the centre of the highway, forty feet wide, should be devoted
to trees and flowers, as is done in many of our cities, it would
hardly have been questioned that this constituted a public
use in the same sense that a park preserve is generally recognized as a public use." 74 This decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in 1901 without opinion. 7 .
Permanent encroachments which fulfil a useful public
purpose have been declared permissible, but permanent encroachments which were erected for private benefit or use
have been generally held to be illegal. 76 An abutting owner
ha; no right to erect and maintain substantial encroachments
which seriously interfere with the rights of the public; but
the courts will uphold his right, under authorized ordinances
permitting him to do so, to maintain minor and unsubstantial encroachments, such as awnings "which have been held
to be within the power of the city authorities to authorize",
the legislature having "classified them with signs, horse
troughs, telegraph posts and such like purposes, as legitimate
street uses. They are within common law rules, encroachments and obstructions; but the most that could be said is
that, if the legislature has stretched its powers in delegating
to the governing body of the municipality the right to authorize the erection of awnings, such an encroachment is of
too unsubstantial a nature to be seriously considered as a
public nuisance." 77
No right being vested in an adjoining owner to erect
and maintain encroachments in the streets except by permis74
Matter of Clinton Ave., 57 App. Div. 166, 172, 68 N. Y. Supp. 196 (2d
Dept. 1901), aff'd, 167 N. Y. 624, 60 N. E. 1108 (1901) ; see Matter of Curran,
38 App. Div. 82, 55 N. Y. Supp. 1018 (2d Dept. 1899).
75 Matter of Clinton Ave., 167 N. Y. 624, 60 N. E. 1108 (1901).
76 City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910); Lyman v.
Village of Potsdam, 228 N. Y. 398, 404, 127 N. E. 312 (1920); McMillan v.
Kiaw & Erlanger Co., 107 App. Div. 407, 95 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dept. 1905).
77 City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 131, 91 N. E. 283 (1910); see
Tymon v. M. L..S. Constr. Co., 262 Ni.Y. 161, 186 N. E. 429 (1933).
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sion of the municipal authorities, he must, when permitted
to do so, construct and maintain the same in conformity with
the city ordinances. 78 If a space occupied by a vault is in
excess of that allowed under the permit, it constitutes a nuisance per se and renders the owner liable to the city.79 And
where a permit had been issued to maintain a vault, the maintenance of an open area is not a compliance with the permit,
but is a nuisance which the city may enjoin.8 0 If a permit
for the construction of vaults had previously been granted,
the licensee may thereafter construct new vaults in the space
occupied by the old vaults without applying for another
permit.8 1 In the absence of an ordinance regulating the construction of any permissible encroachment, the licensee must
construct the same in a careful manner so as to protect the
public against danger and the municipality against lia82
bility.

In an action between an abutting owner and a third
person, it will generally be presumed that a minor encroachment, which was within the power of the municipal authorities to permit and which has existed for a long time without objection, was legally built under a permit.8 3 Where a
78 Irvine v. Wood, 51 N. Y. 224 (1872); Clifford v. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52
(1880) ; Rehberg v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 91 N. Y. 137 (1883) ; Donnelly v.
City of Rochester, 166 N. Y. 315, 59 N. E. 989 (1901); Devine v. Nat. Wall
Paper Co., 95 App. Div. 194, 88 N. Y. Supp. 704 (2d Dept. 1904), aff'd, 182

N. Y. 565, 75 N. E. 1127 (1905) ; City of N. Y. v. DePeyster, 120 App. Div.
762, 105 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1st Dept. 1907), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 547, 83 N. E.
1127 (1907) ; Simis v. Brookfield, 13 Misc. 569, 34 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1895).
79 City of N. Y. v. DePeyster, 120 App. Div. 762, 105 -N. Y. Supp. 612
(1st Dept. 1907), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 547, 83 N. E. 1123 (1907) ; City of N. Y. v.
Gerry, 100 Misc. 297, 165 N. Y. Supp. 659 (1917).
8o City of N. Y. v. DePeyster, 120 App. Div. 762, 105 N. Y. Supp. 612
(1st Dept. 1907), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 547, 83 N. E. 1123 (1907).
81 Mahoney v. City of N. Y., 145 App. Div. 884, 130 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st
Dept. 1911).
82 Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. Y. 79 (1858); Irvine v. Wood, 51 N. Y. 224
(1872); Village of Port Jervis v. First Nat. Bank, 96 N. Y. 550 (1884);
Babbage v. Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132 (1891) ; Lamming v. Galusha,
135 N. Y. 239, 31 N. E. 1024 (1892); People ex rel. Ziegler v. Collis, 17 App.
Div. 448, 45 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1st Dept. 1897), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 704, 53 N. E.
1130 (1899) ; Schubkegel v. Butler, 76 App. Div. 10, 78 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1st
Dept. 1902).
83 Jennings v. Van Schaick, 108 N. Y. 530, 15 N. E. 424 (1888) ; Babbage
v. Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132 (1891); Jorgensen v. Squires, 144
N. Y. 280, 39 N. E. 373 (1895) ; People ex rel. Ziegler v. Collis, 17 App. Div.
448, 45 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1st Dept. 1897), af'd, 158 N. Y. 704, 53 N. E. 1130
(1899); Donnelly v. City of Rochester, 166 N. Y. 315, 318, 59 N. E. 989
(1901); Tymon v. M. L. S. Constr. Co., 262 N. Y. 161, 186 N. E. 429 (1933) ;
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cellar door had existed for twenty years without objection, 84
a coal hole had been maintained for eighteen years,8 5 and a
vault had been built nine years ago,"" it was held that there
was a presumption that the encroachments were erected with
the consent of the municipal authorities. While no such consent will be presumed in an action between the city and an
abutting owner, 7 it has been held that where a vault had
been built before the enactment of statutes and ordinances
requiring permits for their construction, the failure to find
any record of a permit did not raise a presumption that the
88
vault was not sanctioned or consented to by the city.
III.

HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE LAW; A REVERSAL OF
PREVIOUS CONCEPTS.

In examining the history of the law on street encroachments and the powers of municipalities generally to license
the erection and maintenance of encroachments on streets,
we find that it was formerly the accepted theory that municipalities had the power to permit abutting owners to construct
substantial, permanent encroachments for their private benefit. Such was the law as late as 1900.19
In Wcrmser v. Brown,90 decided in 1896, it was held
that bay windows could be built six feet beyond the street
line, provided they were within the stoop line, the court saying: "The legislature, by virtue of its general control over
public streets and highways, has power to authorize strucKuechenmeister v. Brown, 13 Misc. 139, 34 N. Y. Supp. 180 (1895), rev'd on
other grounds, 1 App. Div. 56, 37 N. Y. Supp. 95 (1st Dept. 1896) ; Schubkegel
v. Butler, 76 App. Div. 10, 78 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1st Dept. 1902); Opper v.
Hellinger, 116 App. Div. 261, 101 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1st Dept. 1906); Town of
Mt. Pleasant v. City of N. Y., 199 App. Div. 315, 191 N. Y. Supp. 741 (2d
Dept. 1921) ; Stern v. Zerinsky Realty Corp., 136 Misc. 912, 241 N. Y. Supp.
231 (1930).
84 Jorgensen v. Squires, 144 N. Y. 280, 39 N. E. 373 (1895).
85 Jennings v. Van Schaick, 108 N. Y. 530, 15 N. E. 424 (1888).
s8 Babbage v. Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132 (1891).
87 Deshong v. City of N. Y., 176 N. Y. 475, 68 N. E. 880 (1903).
88
Title Guar. & Tr. Co. v. City of N. Y., 205 N. Y. 496, 99 N. E. 160
(1912) ; see People ex rel. Ziegler v. Collis, 17 App. Div. 448, 45 N. Y. Supp.
282 (1st Dept. 1897), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 704, 53 N. E. 1130 (1899).
89 Wormser v. Brown, 149 N. Y. 163, 43 N. E. 524 (1896) ; Broadbelt v.
Loew, 15 App. Div. 343, 44 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dept. 1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y.
642, 57 N. E. 1105 (1900).
90 149 N. Y. 163, 43 N. E. 524 (1896).
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tures in the streets which, without such authority and under
the common law, would be held to be encroachments or obstructions, and this power it may delegate to the governing
body of a municipal corporation."
In 1900 the Court of Appeals affirmed, without opinion,
a decision of the Appellate Division which held that a bay
window encroaching seven and one-half inches and a stoop
which encroached between six and seven feet were permissible encroachments which the municipality had power to license.0 1 Van Brunt, P.J., dissented from this decision, saying: "The power to regulate areas gives no power to devote
the same to other purposes than those of an area, such as
filling up, in whole or' in part, by permanent building. Such
a rule would enable the common council to authorize the extension of all buildings into the Street."
A few years later the Court of Appeals effected a complete reversal of the law, and the dissenting opinion of Van
Brunt, P.J., became the law of the state. Commenting upon
this reversal, the Appellate Division said: "It may perhaps
be relevant to point out that Presiding Justice Van Brunt,
in a dissenting memorandum in Broa-dbelt v. Loeuw (15 App.
Div. 343), accurately foretold the event." 92
Beginning with Ackerman v. True 93 in 1903, which reversed the previous conception of the law, and the line of
decisions since that date, it is now the law that municipalities
have no right to license the erection of permanent and substantial encroachments for private benefit. As no power is
vested in the legislature to permit such encroachments, it
naturally follows that it cannot confer such power upon the
municipalities. Under the Charter provisions, the city has,
at various times, assumed such power and enacted ordinances
permitting abutting owners to erect permanent and substantial encroachments in the streets, but such an assumption
of authority, as is not even possessed by the legislature, has
been repeatedly condemned, and it is now universally recog94
nized that no such power exists.
91 Broadbelt v. Loew, 15 App. IDiv. 343, 44 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dept.
1897),
92 aff'd, 162 N. Y. 642, 57 N. E. 1105 (1900).
Williams v. Silverman R. & C. Co., 111 App. Div. 679, 685, 97 N. Y.
Supp. 945 (1st Dept. 1906).
93 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903).
94 Gould v. H. R. R., 6 N. Y. 522 (1852); St. Vincent Orphan Asylum v.
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"There is no right in the city to use its property
therein, as it might corporate property, nor otherwise
than as the legislature may authorize for some public
use or benefit. * * * It follows, from the nature of its
title, that the city cannot dispose of the streets for,
nor divert them to, private uses. Whatever the power
of control, or of regulation, possessed by the legislature, it is restricted in the direction of what may be
deemed to be a public use, having in view, of course,
the demands of a progressive civilization. * * * The
streets were opened for the unrestricted use of the
public and the assessments for the costs were levied
upon the properties benefited, and were paid, upon
the implied promise that they should be maintained,
in all their integrity, as public highways. Any erection of permanent and substantial structures thereon,
not for public use, would constitute an encroachment,
or obstruction, and would, therefore, be a public
nuisance." 95
Municipalities may invoke the aid of a court of equity
to prevent the erection, or to compel the removal, of an enCity of Troy, 76 N. Y. 108 (1879); Cohen v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 113 N. Y.
532, 21 N. E. 700 (1889); People ex rel. Wooster v. Maher, 141 N. Y. 330,
36 N. E. 396 (1894); D. L. & W. R. R. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 4 App. Div.
562, 38 N. Y. Supp. 510 (4th Dept. 1896), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 266, 53 N. E. 44
(1899) ; Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903) ; Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. 42nd St. R. R., 85 App. Div. 530, 83 N. Y. Supp. "469 (1st Dept.
1903), aff'd, 176 N. Y. 408, 68 N. E. 864 (1903); Deshong v. City of N. Y.,
176 N. Y. 475, 68 N. E. 880 (1903) ; Matter of Rhinehard v. Redfield, 93 App.
Div. 410, 87 N. Y. Supp. 789 (2d Dept. 1904), af'd, 179 N. Y. 69, 72 N. E.
1150 (1904) ; Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907) ; City of
N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; People ex rel. Swan v.
Doxsee, 136 App. Div. 400, 120 N. Y. Supp. 962 (2d Dept. 1910), aff'd, 198
N. Y. 605, 92 N. E. 1098 (1910) ; People ex rel. Comatus v. Willis, 9 App. Div.
214, 41 N. Y. Supp. 168 (2d Dept. 1896); People ex rel. O'Reilly v. Mayor,
59 How. Pr. 277 (N. Y. 1880); McMillan v. Klaw & Erlanger Co., 107 App.
Div. 407, 95 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dept. 1905) ; Williams v. Silverman R. & C.
Co., 111 App. Div. 679, 97 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1st Dept. 1906) ; City of N. Y. v.
Knickerbocker Trust Co., 52 Misc. 222, 102 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1906), aff'd, 121
App. Div. 740, 106 N. Y. Supp. 506 (1st Dept. 1907) ; People ex rel. Cross Co.
v. Ahearn, 124 App. Div. 840, 109 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1st Dept. 1908); Matter
of Sweet Mfg. Co. v. Van Der Hoof, 137 App. Div. 492, 121 N. Y. Supp. 842
(4th Dept. 1910).
95 City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 129, 91 N. E. 283 (1910); see
A. & D. S. Realty Corp. v. Kass, 119 Misc. 735, 736, 197 N. Y. Supp. 279
(1922).
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croachment from a street,96 and this remedy may be pursued
irrespective of the fact that the city had issued a permit authorizing the encroachment."
That a city ordinance prescribes a penalty for the maintenance of an encroachment
or obstruction will not relegate the city to an action at law
to recover the penalty.9 8 The fact that the encroachment is
10 0
ornamental,9 9 or that it was built within the stoop lines,
will not make it any the less illegal. And where the city
has issued a permit to encroach upon a street, a demand by
the city for the removal of the encroachment is sufficient notice of the revocation of the permit. 1 1
Encroachments, such as an ornamental masonry wall
extending from six to seven feet into the street but within
the stoop line, 10 2 an areaway with a coping and a flight of
stone steps extending about fourteen feet beyond the building line, 0 3 a porch which projected more than thirteen feet
into the street, 0 4 a building encroaching ten feet upon the
street 105 and a portico which encroached sixteen feet beyond
98 City of Cohoes v. D. & H. C. Co., 134 N. Y. 397, 31 N. E. 887 (1892);
People ex rel. Wooster v. Maher, 141 N. Y. 330, 36 N. E. 700 (1889) ; Village
of Oxford v. Willoughby, 181 N. Y. 155, 73 N. E. 677 (1905); City of N. Y.
v. DePeyster, 120 App. Div. 762, 105 N. Y. Supp. 612 (lst Dept. 1907), aff'd,
190 N. Y. 547, 83 N. E. 1123 (1907) ; Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson, 124
App. Div. 18, 108 N. Y. Supp. 506 (2d Dept. 1908), affd, 192 N. Y. 54, 84
N. E. 578 (1908); City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910);
City of N. Y. v. Thorley, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 19, 1901, p. 631, col. 1, aff'd, 73
App. Div. 626, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1123 (lst Dept. 1902); City of N. Y. v. U. S.
Trust Co., 116 App. Div. 349, 101 N. Y. Supp. 574 (1st Dept. 1906) ; City of
N. Y. v. Knickerbocker Tr. Co., 52 Misc. 222, 102 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1906),
aff'd, 121 App. Div. 740, 106 N. Y. Supp. 506 (lst Dept. 1907).
- People ex rel. Wooster v. Maher, 141 N. Y. 330, 36 N. E. 396 (1894);
City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910) ; City of N. Y. v.
Knickerbocker Tr. Co., 52 Misc. 222, 102 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1906), aff'd, 121
App. Div. 740, 106 N. Y. Supp. 506 (1st Dept. 1907).
98 City of N. Y. v. DePeyster, 120 App. Div. 762, 105 N. Y. Supp. 612
(1st Dept. 1907), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 547, 83 N. E. 1123 (1907) ; City of N. Y. v.
Knickerbocker Tr. Co., 52 Misc. 222, 102 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1906), afftd, 121
App. Div. 740, 106 N. Y. Supp. 506 (1st Dept. 1907).
"9City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910); McMillan v.
Klaw & Erlanger Co., 107 App. Div. 407, 95 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dept.
1905); People ex rel. Cross Co. v. Ahearn, 124 App. Div. 840, 109 N. Y. Supp.
249 (1st Dept. 1908).
100 City of N. Y. v. Rice, 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910).
101 Ibid.
102

Ibid.

303 City of N. Y. v. Knickerbocker Tr. Co., 52 Misc. 222, 102 N. Y. Supp.

900 (1906), aff'd, 104 App. Div. 223, 93 N. Y. Supp. 937 (1st Dept. 1905).
104 People ex rel. Wooster v. Maher, 141 N. Y. 330, 36 N. E. 396 (1894).
105 Village of Oxford v. Willoughby, 181 N. Y. 155, 73 N. E. 677 (1905).

1939 ]

NEW YORK LAW ON ENCROACHMENTS

25

the building line, 10 6 were held to be illegal encroachments
and ordered removed. While such encroachments were serious and substantial, the same rules of law are also applicable
to less extensive encroachments. Whenever the municipal
authorities decide that the public interest requires the full
and unobstructed width of any particular street, they can
compel the removal of all encroachments therefrom and require the abutting owners to cut back to the building line.
If a street or a highway has been created by prescription or user and there is no record of its boundaries, a building standing for a long period of time and practically monumenting one side of the highway, cannot be said to encroach
thereon, 10 7 for the reason that the public use of the highway
defines the extent of the public easement therein.'10 8 Hence,
where a building fifty years old apparently encroached upon
a highway from seventy-seven one-hundredths feet to ninetyfour one-hundredths feet and there was no record of the
boundary lines of the highway, it was held that there was
no encroachment. In that case it was said: "It, doubtless, is a highway created by prescription, * * * and if

so, its extent must be limited to the portion actually
used. * * * There is no evidence that it was ever used west-

erly of the east wall of the plaintiffs' building and the other
buildings in line with it. * * * While it is true that an abutting owner cannot acquire title to any portion of a highway
by a long, continued encroachment, * * * it is equally true
that the public, except by deed, dedication, condemnation
or adverse user for public travel, for such length of time as
will raise a presumption of a grant, cannot acquire the right
to use the abutting owners' premises as a street." 109
lo City of N. Y. v. Thorley, N. Y. L. J, Nov. 19, 1901, p. 631, col. 1, aff'd,
73 App. Div. 626, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1123 (1st Dept. 1902).
107 Talmage v. Huntting, 29 N. Y. 447 (1864) ; Harrison v. Platt, 35 App.
Div. 533, 54 N. Y. Supp. 842 (1st Dept. 1898), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 712, 53 N. E.
1126 (1899) ; Lighton v. City of Syracuse, 48 Misc. 134, 96 N. Y. Supp. 692
(1905), af'd, 112 App. Div. 589, 98 N. Y. Supp. 792 (4th Dept. 1906), rez'd
on otwr grounds, 188 N. Y. 499, 81 N. E. 464 (1907) ; McCutcheon v. Terminal
Station Commission, 88 Misc. 148, 150 N. Y. Supp. 850 (1914), aff'd, 168 App.
Div. 301, 154 N. Y. Supp. 711 (4th Dept. 1915), aff'd, 217 N. Y. 127, 111 N. E.
661 (1916); Freer v. Arnold, 123 Misc. 619, 205 N. Y. Supp. 801 (1924);
Parsons v. Village of Rye, 140 N. Y. Supp. 961 (1912).
108 Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51, 63 (1865) ; People v. Sutherland, 252
N. Y. 86, 90, 168 N. E. 838 (1929).
109 Lighton v. City of Syracuse, 48 Misc. 134, 148, 96 N. Y. Supp. 692
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Whether or not a lessee will be required to remove encroachments at his own expense, in the event that the city
demands their removal, depends upon the provisions contained in the lease. In one case, a sub-lessee, who had covenanted to perform and comply with all orders of the city authorities, was required to pay the cost of removing an encroaching show window when ordered to do so by the city.1 10
That decision was based upon the ground that the tenant had
rebuilt the show window and he should, therefore, pay for
the cost of removing it, although the reconstruction and alteration of the window did not increase the extent of the
original encroachment.
In commenting upon this decision in a subsequent action (not involving street encroachments), where a similar
covenant was construed differently, the court said: "It is
true this court held * * * that tenants were obliged, under
clauses in leases somewhat similar to this, to remove show
windows which encroached upon the street, but in those cases
the windows were public nuisances and had been erected
either by tenants or for their benefit." 111
Two years later the Court of Appeals reversed a similar
ruling of the Appellate Division in the case of Herald Square
Realty Co. v. Sakis & 0o.112 on the ground that the language
of the covenant in the lease was not sufficiently inclusive to
require the tenant to remove encroachments, and on the
further ground that the changed attitude of the city with
respect to encroachments could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when they executed the lease. The
court said: "Had it been the purpose of the parties to guard
against the extraordinary contingency that some later municipal administration might require the removal of such structural encroachments as show windows, they could easily have
expressed that important consideration in terms too definite
(1905), aff'd, 112 App. Div. 589, 98 N. Y. Supp. 792 (4th Dept. 1906), reV'd
on other grounds, 188 N. Y. 499, 81 N. E. 464 (1907).
210 Morrissy v. Rhinelander Real Estate Co., 158 App. Div. 533, 143 N. Y.
Supp. 826 (lst Dept. 1913).
1
Warrin v. Haverty, 159 App. Div. 840, 843, 144 N. Y. Supp. 1004 (1st
Dept. 1913).
112215

N. Y. 427, 109 N. E. 545 (1915).
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to be misunderstood." Other decisions have likewise construed such a covenant in favor of the tenant.1 1 3
In 1923, a like covenant in a long term lease, requiring
the tenant to comply with all orders, rules and regulations
of the municipality, was construed to impose upon the tenant the obligation of removing street encroachments whenever the municipality required their removal, on the ground
1 14
that such changes were not extraordinary and unforeseen.
The court predicated its decision upon the ground that in
the instant case there had not been an unforeseen change in
the policy of the municipality with respect to street encroachments since the execution of the lease, and that, therefore,
the removal of encroachments must have been within the
contemplation of the parties; that the decision in the Herald
Square Realty Co. case was based upon the fact that when
that lease was executed it was unforeseeable that the municipal policy would be changed in that respect, and that, therefore, such a change was not in the minds of the parties when
they signed the lease.
Several obvious conclusions may be drawn from these
decisions. First, in the Herald Square Realty Co. case, the
court did say that the changed policy of the municipality
could not have been anticipated or prophesied. Second, it
is now generally known that the policy of the city has changed
and is more stringent than in the past, and such knowledge
will be chargeable to a lessee who attempts to plead surprise.
Third, a lease can be drawn with a covenant sufficiently allinclusive to require a tenant to remove street encroachments
at his own expense.
As it is the universal custom to incorporate various
forms of this covenant in long-term leases, it is incumbent
upon the lessee, for his own protection, to ascertain the nature of the street encroachments, if any, before executing
a lease, or else to limit the effect of the covenant so as to
exclude the possibility of his being compelled to remove them.
113 City of N. Y. v. U. S. Trust Co., 116 App. Div. 349, 101 N. Y. Supp.
574 (1st Dept. 1906) ; Holden v. O'Brien, 209 App. Div. 266, 204 N. Y. Supp.
340 (1st Dept. 1924); Seligman & Co. v. Grotsky, 118 Misc. 139, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 632 (1922).
114Melcher v. Sobel, 120 Misc. 378, 198 N. Y. Supp. 318 (1923), aff'd,
208 App. Div. 799 (lst Dept. 1924).
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Otherwise he may be confronted with a costly undertaking
in the event that the city should require him to remove substantial encroachments.
IV.

REMOVAL OF HIGHWAY ENCROACHMENTS BY MUNICIPALITIES-LAPSE OF TIMiE OR ACQUIESCENCE DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE AN ESTOPPEL.

The maxim, " dnultum temnpus, occurit regi", is not restricted in its application to sovereignty, but applies also to
municipal corporations as trustees of the rights of the public.
No matter how long a nuisance or an encroachment upon a
highway may have existed, a prescriptive right to maintain
or to continue the same cannot arise as against a municipality. The public cannot be barred by the neglect of municipal officers to do their duty, 115 and no title by adverse posses115 Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51 (1865) (which overrules Peckham v.
Henderson, 27 Barb: 207 (N. Y. 1858), in which it was held that the public is

precluded after the lapse of twenty years) ; Kellog v. Thompson, 66 N. Y. 88
(1876); St. Vincent Orphan Asylum v. City of Troy, 76 N. Y. 108 (1879);
Bliss v. Johnson, 94 N. Y. 235, 241 (1883) ; Driggs v. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77,
8 N. E. 514 (1886); Hughes v. M. E. R. R., 130 N. Y. 14, 28 N. E. 765 (1891);
City of Cohoes v. D. & H. C. Co., 134 N. Y. 397, 31 N. E. 887 (1892) ; People
ex rel. Wooster v. Maher, 141 N. Y. 330, 36 N. E. 396 (1894) ; Delaware L.
& W. R. R. v. City of Buffalo, 4 App. Div. 562, 38 N. Y. Supp. 510 (4th Dept.
1896), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 266, 53 N. E. 44 (1899) ; Mangam v. Village of Sing
Sing, 26 Apjp. Div. 464, 50 N. Y. Supp. 647 (2d Dept. 1898), aff'd, 164 N. Y.
560, 58 N. E. 1089 (1900) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. 42nd St. R. R., 85 App.
Div. 530, 83 N. Y. Supp. 469 (1st Dept. 1903), aff'd, 176 N. Y. 408, 68 N. E.
864 (1903) ; Deshong v. City of N. Y., 176 N. Y. 475, 68 N. E. 880 (1903) ;
Lighton v. City of Syracuse, 48 Misc. 134, 96 N. Y. Supp. 692 (1905), aff'd,
112 App. Div. 589, 98 N. Y. Supp.7 792 (4th Dept. 1906), ree/d on other grounds,
188 N. Y. 499, 81 N. E. 464 (190 )A City of Buffalo v. D. L. & W. R. L, 190
N. Y. 84, 82 N. E. 513 (1907) ; City of N. Y. v. DePeyster, 120 App. Div. 762,
105 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1st Dept. 1907), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 547, 83 N. E. 1123
(1908) ; Fulton L. H. & P. Co. v. State of N. Y., 200 N. Y. 400, 422, 94 N. E.
199 (1911); City of Mt. Vernon v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. P,, 232 N. Y. 309,
133 N. E. 900 (1922); People v. Baldwin, 197 App. Div. 285, 188 N. Y. Supp.
542 (3d Dept. 1921), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 672, 135 N. E. 964 (1922); Morison v.
N. Y. El. Ry., 74 Hun 398, 26 N. Y. Supp. 641 (1st Dept. 1873); Iselin v.
Village of Cold Spring, 120 App. Div. 576, 105 N. Y. Supp. 184 (2d Dept.
1907); Shipston v. City of Niagara Falls, 187 App. Div. 421, 176 N. Y. Supp.
393 (4th Dept. 1919) ; Town of Mt. Pleasant v. City of N. Y., 199 App. Div.
315, 191 N. Y. Supp. 741 (2d Dept. 1921).
The case of Varick v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 4 Johns. Ch. 53 (N. Y. 1819),
holding that an encroachment by a greenhouse of from two feet eight inches to
ten feet six inches for twenty-five years ripened into a good title as against the
city, has not been followed or approved. Town of Brookhaven v. Dyett S. L.
Brick Co., 75 Misc. 310, 135 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1912) ; Finch, Pruyn & Co., Inc.
v. State of N. Y., 122 Misc. 404, 409, 203 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1924) ; Parsons v.
Village of Rye, 140 N. Y. Supp. 961 (1921).
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sion can ever be acquired against a municipality no matter
how long an encroachment or obstruction may have existed. 116
"The Erie Canal is a great public highway, and
no individual, according to well established principles, can gain for himself an easement on a highway
by prescription, or in any way make a valid encroachment upon the public right. It is not necessary to affirm that an individual cannot enclose public land and
gain title to it by a long continued adverse possession.
It has been held in a number of cases that this can be
done without reference to the statute of limitations,
and that a grant may be presumed.

* * *

This, how-

ever, is a very different case from that where an individual seeks to limit the right of the public to use
their public works, and perhaps to impair their efficiency for his own private benefit. In that case, no
user for any length of time will affect the public right.
This rule was laid down as to an encroachment upon
a public highway, in Gerring v. Barfield (16 C. B.
[N.S.], 597). It is there stated that the fact that a
piece of ground, part of a public highway, has for
twenty years been used by an innkeeper for the standing of vehicles belonging to his guests, is no answer
to a complaint for an obstruction of the highway.
Byles, J. said: 'As regards private rights, twenty
years' user is important. There may be a presumption
creating or extinguishing a right by user or non-user;
but once a highway always a highway'. (P. 604.)
So it was held in Morton v. Moore (15 Gray, 573),
that a right to deposit sawlogs within the limits of a
highway cannot be maintained by evidence that the
owner of a saw-mill in the vicinity has been accustomed to deposit them there for more than twenty
years. The line of argument in that case was, that
the right of the public to a highway is paramount and
controlling. The right extends to the entire territory
within its limits, and consequently no one can be de116 Town of Mt. Pleasant v. City of N. Y., 199 App. Div. 315, 191 N. Y.
Supp. 741 (2d Dept. 1921).
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prived of the enjoyment of such an easement by any
adverse or unlawful use or occupation of the way by
an individual for his private purposes. An obstruction to it, however long continued, is unlawful, and
no right can be acquired by persisting in the maintenance of it.

* * *

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

has had frequent occasion to consider this subject in
its application to public works, and has regularly and
emphatically repudiated the notion that the doctrines
of prescription can be extended to encroachments upon
them by individuals.

* *

* It wag said in those cases

that no lapse of time furnishes a defence to an encroachment on a public right, and that a presumption
of a grant cannot be made to support such an encroachment, and also that no private occupancy, for
whatever time, and whether adverse or by permission,
can vest a title inconsistent with the public rights." 117
Where a dock was erected over a street, the rights of
the public were held not to have been extinguished, as the
dock took the place of the street and the public had the same
right on the dock as it formerly had in the street. 118

Simi-

larly, the laying of a plank road on a street by a plank road
company was held not to have changed the character of the
thoroughfare, as it still continued as a street. The public,
in consideration of the payment of tolls, was relieved from
keeping it in repair and the public authorities were not divested of jurisdiction over it. 119
After a municipality has acquiesced in the maintenance
of an illegal obstruction in a street, it may not thereafter
recover damages for trespass or for the illegal use and occupation of the street. Hence, in an action by a city against
a railroad company to recover damages on the ground that
the railroad company had illegally maintained tracks in the
streets between 1921 and 1935 without the consent of the
117 Burbank v. Fay 65 N. Y. 57, 69 '(1875).
118 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. 42d St. R. R., 85 App. Div. 530, 83 N. Y.
Supp. 469 (1st Dept. 1903), aff'd, 176 N. Y. 408, 68 N. E. 864 (1903) ; City of
Buffalo v. D. L. & W. R. R., 190 N, Y. 84, 82 N. E. 513 (1907).
11 Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51 (1865) ; Matter of Rochester E. R. R.
123 N. Y. 351, 25 N. E. 381 (1890); People ex rel. Cayadutta P. R. R. v.
Cummings, 166 N. Y. 110, 59 N. E. 703 (1901).
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city, it was held that the acquiescence by the city of such an
illegal occupation of the streets without any effort to pre-

vent it, precluded the city from claiming damages. 120
V.

Six YuARS

NON-UsER TERMINATES HIGHWAY.

The New York Highway Law 121 declares that every
highway that shall not have been opened and worked within
six years from the time it shall have been dedicated to public
use or laid out, shall cease to be a highway, and that every
highway that shall not have been travelled or used as such
for six years, shall cease to be a highway.' 2 2 This provision
has been held not to be applicable where the fee is owned by
has an
the municipality, but only where the municipality
23

easement for street or highway purposes.
After a highway has once been established, however, it
does not cease to be a highway unless it can be shown that
24
its use as a highway has been abandoned or discontinued,'

and the burden of proof is upon the one who claims that
there has been an abandonment, for, a highway once shown
120 City of N. Y. v. Staten Island R. T. Ry., 277 N. Y. 485, 14 N. E. (2d)
805 (1938).
121 N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW § 205.
322 Beckwith v. Whalen, 65 N. Y. 322 (1875) ; Horey v. Village of Haerstraw, 124 N. Y. 273, 26 N. E. 532 (1891) ; Excelsior Brick Co. v. Village of
Haverstraw, 142 N. Y. 146, 36 N. E. 819 (1894); Barnes v. Midland R. R.
Terminal Co., 218 N. Y. 91, 112 N. E. 926 (1916); City of New Rochelle v.
New Rochelle Coal & Lumber Co., 224 N. Y. 696, 121 N. E. 270 (1918) ; Town
of Leray v. N. Y. C. R. R., 226 N. Y. 109, 123 N. E. 145 (1919); Kyser v.
N. Y. Central R. R., 211 App. Div. 500, 207 N. Y. Supp. 536 (4th Dept. 1925) ;
Matter of Schuyler v. Town of Angelica, 137 Misc. 190, 242 N. Y. Supp. 78,
aff'd, 232 App. Div. 718 (4th Dept. 1931) ; see Matter of Avoca Soil Imp. Co.,
Inc. v. Wilber, 137 Misc. 827, 245 N. Y. Supp. 65 (1930).
123 N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. v. City of Buffalo, 200 N. Y. 113, 93 N. E. 520
(1910); Granby Pulp & Paper Co. v. City of Fulton, 189 App. Div. 521, 179
N. Y. Supp. 205 (4th Dept. 1919), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 535, 143 N. E. 732 (1923) ;
Silver Beach Realty Corp. v. Geelan, 122 Misc. 644, 204 N. Y. Supp. 701
(1925), aff'd, 210 App. Div. 829 (1st Dept. 1924).
124 Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57 (1875); Driggs v. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77,
8 N. E. 514 (1886) ; City of Cohoes v. D. & H. C. Co., 134 N. Y. 397, 31 N. E.
887 (1892); People v. Fowler, 43 N. Y. St. Rep. 415, 17 N. Y. Supp. 744
(2d Dept. 1892), aff'd, 139 N. Y. 621, 34 N. E. 205 (1893); City of Buffalo
v. D. L. & W. R. R-, 190 N. Y. 84, 82 N. E. 513 (1907) ; Matter of Scheibel
v. O'Brien, 230 N. Y. 277, 281, 130 N. E. 293 (1921) ; Matter of City of N. Y.,
189 App. Div. 181, 178 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dept. 1919).
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to exist is presumed to continue until its abandonment is
125

affirmatively proved.
If only a part of the highway is obstructed and there is
sufficient width remaining for public travel, an abandonment
of the occupied or obstructed portion will not work an abandonment of that part of the highway. 126 If, however, the
highway is obstructed or occupied for its entire width and

the highway at that point remains unused for six years, the
right to obstruct and occupy the highway will have become
a vested right. It then ceases to be a highway and the person
who has obstructed it cannot be thereafter enjoined, even
though such obstruction,- in the beginning, was a wrongful
act.127 "The closing may have been a wrongful act. None
the less, if for six years the highway remains closed with the

acquiescence of the public, there is an extinguishment of the
public right. * * * Obstructions of a highway across part of

its width only, narrowing but not closing the line of travel,
are not sufficient, however long continued, to put an end to
its existence. * * * To have that effect the obstruction must
cover the entire width. But if the entire width is blocked,

the obstructed section ceases to be a highway, even though
other sections are unobstructed. It is not necessary to show
an abandonment along the entire length.

*

*

* These

rules have no application where the fee is vested in the
public. * * * " 128
Towra of Leray v. N. Y. C. R. 1 0.129
o.
was an action
for an injunction to restrain the obstruction of a highway.
125

Beckwith v. Whalen, 65 N. Y. 322 (1875) ; Horey v. Village of Haverstraw, 124 N. Y. 273, 26 N. E. 532 (1891) ; City of Cohoes v. D. & H. C. Co.,
134 N. Y. 397, 31 N. E. 887 (1892) ; Matter of Scheibel v. O'Brien, 230 N. Y.
277, 130 N. E. 293 (1921).
126 Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51 (1865) ; Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57
(1875) ; Mangam v. Village of Sing Sing, 26 App. Div. 464, 50 N. Y. Supp.
647 (2d Dept. 1898), aff'd, 164. N. Y. 560, 58 N. E. 1089 (1900); Sweet v.
Perkins, 196 N. Y. 482, 90 N. E. 50 (1909) ; Shipston v. City of Niagara Falls,
187 App. Div. 421, 176 N. Y. Supp. 393 (4th Dept. 1919); People ex rel.
N. Y. 0. & W. R. R. v. Tax Comm., 190 App. Div. 73, 179 N. Y. Supp. 364
(3d Dept. 1919).
127 Horey v. Village of Haverstraw, 124 N. Y. 273, 26 N. E. 532 (1891);
Barnes v. Midland R. R. Terminal Co., 218 N. Y. 91, 112 N. E. 926 (1916);
City of New Rochelle v. New Rochelle Coal & Lumber Co., 224 N. Y. 696,
121 N. E. 270 (1918).
128 Barnes v. Midland R. R. Terminal Co., 218 N. Y. 91, 98, 112 N. E. 926
(1916).
129 226 N. Y. 109, 123 N. E. 145 (1919).
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The defendant, whose railroad tracks crossed the highway
at right angles, obstructed the entire width of the street at
that point by the erection of a building. This obstruction
persisted for more than six years and it was held that, as
the highway had been made impassable and had therefore
been abandoned for the statutory period, the defendant could
not be enjoined. City of Cohoes v. D. & H. C. Co.13 ° is not
contrary to the later decisions, as in that case there was a
lack of evidence as to the discontinuance or abandonment
of the highway, the court saying: "When a highway is once
shown to exist, it is presumed to continue until it is shown
to exist no longer. * * * The presumption is in favor of continuance, not of cessation." Nor are the decisions in City
of Buffalo v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co.131 and Iselin v. Village
of Cold Spring 132 contrary to the rule above set forth, as in
those cases it was found that the locus in quo never was a
highway.
After a highway has been abandoned for six years, the
abutting owners, having title to the same, may fence it in
or build on it, and convey a good title thereto. 133

VT.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ABUTTING OWNERS.

A person who suffers damage or is specially injured by
reason of an unreasonable use of, obstruction or encroachment on a street or highway, or who will be injured by a
threatened erection of an encroachment, may maintain an
action to recover damages, to abate the nuisance, or for an
injunction to compel the removal or prevent the threatened
erection of an encroachment. While the obstruction thereon,
or the unreasonable use thereof, may be a public nuisance,
it may at the same time constitute a private nuisance to an
130

134 N. Y. 397, 31 N. E. 887 (1892).

1'68 App. Div. 488, 74 N. Y. Supp. 343 (1st Dept. 1902), aff'd, 178 N. Y.

561, 70 N. E. 1097 (1904).

120 App. Div. 576, 105 N. Y. Supp. 184 (2d Dept. 1907).
133 Amsbry v. Hinds, 48 N. Y. 57 (1871) ; Excelsior Brick Co. v. Village
132

of Haverstraw, 142 N. Y. 146, 36 N. E. 819 (1894); Pooler v. Sammet, 130
App. Div. 650, 115 N. Y. Supp. 578 (1st Dept. 1909).
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adjoining owner or to one who has been specially injured
34

thereby.1

An owner of a factory erected a platform ninety feet

long and two feet ten inches high upon the sidewalk, which
platform was used for loading and unloading trucks several
hours each day. The platform, the erection of which was

consented to by the city authorities, extended four feet eight
inches into the street, and when the trucks were backed up
134 Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. Y. 79 (1858); Doolittle v. Supervisors of
Broome Co., 18 N. Y. 155 (1858); Wager v. Troy U. R. R, 25 N. Y. 526
(1862)_; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188 (1863) ; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611
(1863); Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53 N. Y. 152 (1873); Adams v. Popham, 76
N. Y. 410 (1879); Story v. N. Y. El. Ry., 90 N. Y. 122 (1882); Mahady v.
Bushwick R. R., 91 N. Y. 148 (1883); Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360,
14 N. E. 264 (1887); Abendroth v. M. R. R., 122 N. Y. 1, 25 N. E. 496
(1890); Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. Y. 596, 28 N. E. 418 (1891); Galway v.
M. E. R. R., 128 N. Y. 132, 28 N. E. 479 (1891); Reining v. N. Y. L. &
W. R. R., 128 N. Y. 157, 28 N. E. 640 (1891) ; Pappenheim v. M. E. R. R.,
128 N. Y. 436, 28 N. E. 518 (1891); Hughes v. M. E. R. R., 130 N. Y. 14,
28 N. E. 765 (1891); Egerer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 130 N. Y. 108, 29
N. E. 95 (1891); Kavanagh v. Barber, 131 N. Y. 211, 30 N. E. 235 (1892);
Wakeman v. Wilbur, 147 N. Y. 657, 42 N. E. 341 (1895) ; Buchholz v. N. Y.
L. E. & W. R. R., 148 N. Y. 640, 43 N. E. 76 (1896); Holroyd v. Sheridan,
53 App. Div. 14, 65 N. Y. Supp. 442 (3d Dept. 1900), aff'd, 166 N. Y. 634,
60 N. E. 1105 (1901) ; Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903) ;
Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907) ; Sweet v. Perkins, 196
N. Y. 482, 90 N. E. 50 (1909) ; People ex rel. Sibley v. Gresser, 205 N. Y. 24,
98 N. E. 205 (1912); Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co., 224 N. Y. 60, 120
N. E. 89 (1918); Tompkins v. City of N. Y., 234 App. Div. 79, 256 N. Y.
Supp. 192 (1st Dept. 1931), aff'd, 260 N. Y. 513, 184 N. E. 72 (1932) ; Early
v. Funk, 275 N. Y. 495, 11 N. E. (2d) 312 (1937) ; Crooke v. Anderson, 23
Hun 266 (N. Y. 1880) ; People v. New York, 18 Abb. N. C. 123 (N. Y. 1885) ;
Overton v. Village of Olean, 37 Hun 47 (N. Y. 1885) ; Henning v. H. V. R. R.,
90 App. Div. 492, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (3d Dept. 1904); McMillan v. Klaw &
Erlanger Co., 107 App. Div. 407, 95 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dept. 1905); Williams v. Silverman R. & C. Co., 111 App. Div. 679, 97 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1st
Dept. 1906) ; People ex rel. Cross Co. v. Ahearn, 124 App. Div. 840, 109 N. Y.
Supp. 249 (1st Dept. 1908) ; Hyland v. Pres., etc. of Ossining, 57 Misc. 212,
107 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1907), aff'd, 127 App. Div. 291, 111 N. Y. Supp. 309
(2d Dept. 1908); People v. Transit Devel. Co., 131 App. Div. 174, 115 N. Y.
Supp. 297 (2d Dept. 1909) ; People ex rel. Ackerman v. Stover, 138 App. Div.
237, 122 N. Y. Supp. 1030 (1st Dept. 1910); Polities v. Times Sq. Imp. Co.,
168 App. Div. 814, 154 N. Y. Supp. 466 (1st Dept. 1915); Hellinger v. City
of N. Y., 181 App. Div. 254, 168 N. Y. Supp. 271 (1st Dept. 1917) ; BrownBrand Realty Co., Inc. v. Saks & Co., 126 Misc. 336, 214 N. Y. Supp. 230
(1926), aff'd, 218 App. Div. 827 (lst Dept. 1926) ; Carpenter v. City of Buffalo,
137 Misc. 618, 244 N. Y. Supp. 224 (1930), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 868 (4th Dept.
1931) ; Decker v. Goddard, 233 App. Div. 139, 251 N. Y. Supp. 440 (4th Dept.
1931); Roock v. Womer, 233 App. Div. 566, 253 N. Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dept.
1931) ; Matter of People ex rel. Neary Memorials, Inc. v. Harvey, 242 App.
Div. 831 (2d Dept. 1934) ; Slattery v. McCaw, 44 Misc. 426, 90 N. Y. Supp. 52
(1904); Levy v. Murray, 56 Misc. 354, 106 N. Y. Supp. 689 (1907); Broad
Ex. Co. v. C. S. & B. Market, Inc., 117 Misc. 82, 191 N. Y. Supp. 534 (1921);
Mann v. Groom, 133 Misc. 260, 231 N. Y. Supp. 342 (1927); Daurizio v.
Merchants D. T. Co., 152 Misc. 716, 718, 274 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1934).
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to the platform, the entire sidewalk was obstructed. This
obstruction compelled travellers to walk around the obstruction by going out into the roadway, or by using the other side
of the street. A retail merchant, whose property was on the
same side of the street and distant eighty feet therefrom,
brought an action to restrain the continuance of the nuisance
and for damages. It was held that, although an owner of
land abutting on a street may encroach thereon to a limited
extent necessary for the transaction of his business, such use
must be reasonable; that if a person sustains a special and
peculiar loss by reason of an unlawful obstruction, he may
recover damages therefor and enjoin the continuance of the
nuisance.
In awarding judgment to the plaintiff, the court said
that "whatever unlawfully turns the tide of travel from the
sidewalk directly in front of a retail store to the opposite
side of the street, is presumed to cause special damage to
the proprietor of that store because diversion of trade inevitably follows diversion of travel" and "the right to maintain the action does not depend on the amount of the special
damage, provided the plaintiff suffered some material injury
peculiar to himself." 135
136
In McMillan v. Klaw & Erlanger Co.,
the defendant
erected an ornamental structure about forty-five feet in
height, which extended into the street four feet beyond the
building line. An adjoining owner sought to compel its removal, but the defendant contended that an ordinance of
the Board of Aldermen sanctioned its erection and maintenance. The ordinance was held unconstitutional on the
ground that it deprived the plaintiff of his property without
due process of law, the court saying: "The Legislature of
the State, acting as the representative of the public at large,
has, within constitutional limitations, authority to control
the use of the street. It may widen the street or narrow it;
may change its course or even close it; and being the representative of the public, it may limit to a certain extent the
use thereof by the public, providing that it does not invade
135 Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. Y. 596, 600, 28 N. E. 418,
Richardson & Boynton Co. v. Barstow Stove Co., 26 Abb. N.
Supp. 935 (1890), aff'd, 59 Hun 624, 13 N. Y. Supp. 358 (1st
136 107 App. Div. 407, 410, 413, 95 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st

419 (1891); see
C. 150, 11 N. Y.
Dept. 1891).
Dept. 1905).
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the property rights of the individual or destroy his property
rights without compensation. The municipality has an interest in the street by reason of its being vested with the fee
thereof. But this fee is a qualified one, being held by it in
trust for the public use and benefit, and that use cannot be
departed from without violating an essential condition of
the contract between it and the abutting property owners, as
expressed by the adjudication in the street opening proceeding under which the land was obtained. So long as the
municipality does not violate the contract it may withdraw
from the use of the general public a portion of the street, providing that it always acts within the constitutional limits
and either under express legislative authority or in the exercise of the inherent right residing in it for controlling the
use of its streets for the purpose for which they were dedicated. Familiar examples of the exercise of this power are
seen in the appropriation of a portion of the streets for hydrants * * * for stepping stones * * * for shade trees and
grass plots * * * for coal holes and vaults * * * for the erection of statuary * * * for public monuments * * * for areaways ** * for stoops and cellarways *** for telegraph and
telephone poles * * * and for other purposes which need not
now be specified. * * * The structure which the defendant
in this case is erecting, however, cannot, in any event, be
regarded as a use of the street which benefits at all the public at large. On the contrary, it enhances the value of the
defendant's property alone, and withdraws from the public
a portion of the street itself. If the legality of the ordinance
be sustained it would permit individuals to appropriate from
two to five feet of public property all along the streets of
the city and under the guise of ornamental projections to
devote the land to whatever uses their private interests might
require."
A bay window encroaching four feet beyond the building line was ordered removed at the suit of an adjoining
owner, notwithstanding that it had been erected in accordance with the requirements and under the authority of a
permit issued by the city. "It is well established by the decisions of this court that interferences with public and common rights create a public nuisance, and -when accompanied
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with special damage to the owner of lands give also a right
of private action to such owner, and that a public nuisance
as to the person who is specially injured thereby in the enjoyment or value of his lands becomes also a private nuisance. That this encroachment upon the street was a public
nuisance and that as to the plaintiff it was a private nuisance we have no doubt. In the language of Blackstone, a
private nuisance is 'anything done to the hurt and annoyance
of the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another', which
embraces not a mere physical injury to the realty, but an
injury to the owner or possessor as respects his dealing with,
possessing or enjoying it, and that one erecting or maintaining such a nuisance is liable in an action at the suit of another who has sustained such special damages, and he may
be restrained in equity from continuing the nuisance." 137
Where the City of New York had erected a public bath,
the columns of which and a cornice substantially encroached
upon the street, it was held, at the suit of an adjoining
owner, that the easements of the adjoining owner of light,
air and access are property rights, and that the city could
not thus take private property for a public use without compensation. In that case, however, it was found that the expense and inconvenience of removing the encroachments far
outweighed the plaintiff's convenience and the plaintiff was,
therefore, awarded money damages for the injury sustained
by him in lieu of the removal of the encroachments. 3 8
In Hatfield v. Strauss, 39 the defendant, under the authority of a permit issued to him by the city authorities,
laid railroad tracks in the street running from his premises
out to and connecting with the tracks of a railway company
running through the street, for the purpose of running express cars thereon for the conveyance of merchandise. The
court held that such use of the street was unlawful, that the
city authorities had no power to issue the permit, and that
the plaintiff, an adjoining owner, was entitled to an injunc137 Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 360, 67 N.'E. 629 (1903).
138 Hellinger v. City of N. Y., 181 App. Div. 254, 168 N. Y. Supp. 271
(1st Dept. 1917).
139 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172 (1907).
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tion to restrain the running of cars and for the removal of
140
the tracks.
A barn erected flush with the building line with doors
swinging outward so as to obstruct the walk, is a nuisance,
and one who is injured by such an obstruction may recover
14 1
from the owner.
A lessee of property who is injured by the maintenance
of an obstruction, may also sue to compel its removal. Where
the cornices and glass fronts of show windows encroached
from three to four feet and an entrance portico encroached
seven feet beyond the building line, they were ordered42removed at the suit of the lessee of an adjoining building.
A marquise, or metal awning, erected with the consent
of the city authorities, was so constructed as to be approximately on a level with the centre of a plate glass show window on the adjoining property, and obstructing the view of
the show window. In awarding judgment compelling its removal and for damages, in an action brought by the adjoining owner, the court said: "While it is true that the city is
vested with the power of control over its streets and may,
in the public interest, authorize structures which otherwise
would be nuisances, it is without power to authorize a structure which is in fact a public nuisance affecting a private
right." 143
There is a distinction between a private use and a public
use. While a private use will be enjoined, a public use will
not be, and a private corporation may operate a railroad in
the street provided such use of the street is for the benefit
of the public. In Stanley v. Jay Street Connecting Railroad,"' it was found that the defendant's railroad was an
integral part of the transportation system of the country;
the freight which it received over the spurs and sidings from
140

(1931).

See Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co., 224 N. Y. 60, 120 N. E. 89

141 Holroyd v. Sheridan, 53 App. Div. 14, 65 N. Y. Supp. 442 (3d Dept.
1900), aff'd, 166 N. Y. 634, 60 N. E. 1112 (1900).
142 People ex rel. Browning, King & Co. v. Stover, 145 App. Div. 259,
130 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dept. 1911), aff'd, 203 N. Y. 613, 96 N. E. 1131 (1911).
143 Brown-Brand Realty Co., Inc. v. Saks & Co., 126 Misc. 336, 339, 214
N. Y. Supp. 230 (1926), aff'd, 218 App. Div. 827 (1st Dept. 1926) ; see Early
v. Funk, 275 N. Y. 495, 11 N. E. 312 (1937).
144 182 App. Div. 399, 169 N. Y. Supp. 530 (1st Dept. 1918), aff'd, 227
N. Y. 639, 126 N. E. 918 (1919).
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private factories was taken to the water front, loaded on
barges, transferred to railroads, and became part of the
interstate commerce of the country; the section of the city
where its tracks were laid was devoted largely, if not exclusively, to factories. An abutting owner attempted to enjoin the operation of the railroad. The court followed its
earlier decisions which held that "when the owner of property abutting on a street owns also the fee of the land in the
bed of the street subject to the public use for street purposes,
a railroad in the street is an additional burden on the fee
which constitutes a taking of property and entitles the owner
to compensation." Although an injunction was denied because the plaintiff did not own the land in the street and the
court held that the use of the street was a public use, the
court stated further that "if it be found that the occupation
of the street is exclusive, permanent and of such a nature
as to deprive the owner of such uses of the street as are appurtenant to his abutting property, usually called the easements of light, air and access, the road, although legal so
far as the rights of the people are concerned, is illegal as
to him until compensation is made. The elevated railroad
cases rest on this principle, * * * and the same is the case

with other permanent and exclusive occupations of the street
for railroad purposes which take easements in streets appurtenant to abutting property. * * * If the use of a street by a

railroad lawfully there is so excessive and unreasonable as
to deprive an owner of abutting property of his easement
therein, he is entitled to his remedy. * * * But no case of

which I am aware goes so far as to hold that rails laid on
the surface of the street without change of grade, and the
reasonable use thereof, constitute a taking of easements in
the street. This is all that the defendant has done." 145
Laches on the part of an adjoining owner will not bar
him from maintaining an action for the removal of the encroachment, 1 4 6 nor is he estopped by his failure to object to
145

See Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co. v. City of N. Y., 212 N. Y. 97,

105 N. E. 803 (1914).

104,

146 Galway v. M. E. R. R., 128 N. Y. 132, 153, 8 N. E. 479 (1891); Hilton
v. City of N. Y., 137 App. Div. 884 (2d Dept. 1910); Brown-Brand Realty Co.,
Inc. v. Saks & Co., 126 Misc. 336, 214 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1926), aff'd, 218 App.
Div. 827 (1st Dept. 1926); Felberose Holding Corp. v. N. Y. Rapid Transit
Corp., 244 App. Div. 427, 430, 279 N. Y. Supp. 645 (2d Dept. 1935).
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its construction even though he had actual knowledge of its
impending erection. 147 No acquiescence, short of the statutory period, will bar a person from complaining of a nuisance unless, by some act or omission, he has induced another
person to take some action upon which an estoppel may be
based. 148 "To establish an estoppel in pais it mustbe shown:
1st. That the person sought to be estopped has made an admission or done an act, with the intention of influencing the
conduct of another, or that he had reason to believe would
influence his conduct, inconsistent with the evidence he proposed to give, or with the title he proposes to set up.
2nd. That the other party has acted upon or been influenced
by such act or declaration. 3rd. That the party will be
prejudiced by allowing the truth of the admission to be disproved." 14' Silence alone will not effect an estoppel unless
there is not only a'right, but a duty to speak. 5 0
In Ackerman v. True,15 1 where the plaintiff succeeded
in compelling the removal of an encroaching bay window
notwithstanding the fact that she had knowledge of the plans
and that a permit for the erection of the encroachment had
been obtained, the court said: "As it is obvious that the
plaintiff, at most, was merely silent while the defendant
erected his building upon- the street, she was not, under the
doctrine of the cases cited, estopped from asserting her right
to have the erection of the defendant adjudged a nuisance,
to insist upon its removal, and to recover her damages
therefor."
The damages recoverable by an abutting owner whose
property is injured by an unlawful encroachment upon another's land is the difference in the value of the plaintiff's
property without the defendant's encroachment, and its value
with the encroachment. 1 52 The injury, however, must be subAckerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903).
148 Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568 (1876).
149 Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519, 541 (1864); see Ackerman v. True,
175 N. Y. 353, 362, 67 N. E. 629 (1903).
150 N. Y. Rubber Co. v. Rothery, 107 N. Y. 310, 14 N. E. 269 (1887);
Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270, 289, 28 N. E. 627 (1891).
147

15, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903).

152Pappenheim v. M. E. R. R., 128
Reisert v. City of N. Y., 174 N. Y. 196,
True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. -29 (1903)
172, 105 N. Y. Supp. 12 (1st Dept. 1907) ;

N. Y. 436, 28 N. E. 518 (1891);
66 N. E. 731 (1903); Ackerman v.
; Ackerman v. True, 120 App. Div.
Close v. Witbeck, 126 App. Div. 544,
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stantial and not merely nominal. 153 Hence, where, on a
business street, the defendant's plate glass show windows
extended one foot into the street, it was held that an adjoin,
ing owner could not compel their removal nor recover damages for injury to his premises, as his easements were not
interfered with and it was not shown that he suffered any
damage from the encroachment. 5 4 The case of Sautter v.
Utica City National Bank, 55 holding that an adjoining
owner could not restrain the erection of five columns extending from sixteen and one-half inches to twenty-three and
three-sixteenths inches into the street, is not law today, except for the proposition that the injury complained of must
be substantial and not nominal. Although that decision was
unanimously affirmed, without opinion, by the Court of Appeals, such an affirmance does not necessarily mean that the
reasoning of the lower court was-approved. "That court has
repeatedly pointed out that, when they affirm without opinion, they are responsible only for the result, and not for the
reason given in the opinion in the lower court by which it
arrived at the result.

* * *

The affirmance of the judgment

in that court means nothing more than upon the facts found
and appearing in the record the judgment was right." "I"
Where an action has been brought to restrain the erection or to compel the removal of an encroachment, and the
defendant upon whose land the encroachment exists or is
about to be erected, conveys the property to a bona fide purchaser during the pendency of the action, a judgment rendered against him to remove the same would be valueless,
as the court cannot compel him to go upon another person's
property and remove the encroachment. In such case the
trial of the action should be suspended and the new owner
110 N. Y. Supp. 717 (3d Dept. 1908); Glyn v. T. G. & T. Co., 132 App. Div.
859, 117 N. Y. Supp. 424 (1st Dept. 1909); Hellinger v. City of N. Y., 181

App. Div. 254, 168 N. Y. Supp. 271 (lst Dept. 1917).

153 Wakeman v. Wilbur, 147 N. Y. 657, 42 N. E. 341 (1895); Sautter v.
Utica City Nat. Bank, 45 Misc. 15, 90 N. Y. Supp. 838 (1904), aff'd, 119 App.
Div. 898 (4th Dept. 1907), affd, 193 N. Y. 661, 87 N. E. 1126 (1908) ; Close v.
Witbeck, 126 App. Div. 544, 110 N. Y. Supp. 717 (3d Dept. 1908).
154 Close v. Witbeck, 126 App. Div. 544, 110 N. Y. Supp. 717 (3d Dept.
1903).
255 45 Misc. 15, 90 N. Y. Supp. 838 (1904), aff'd, 119 App. Div. 898 (4th
Dept. 1907), aff'd, 193 N. Y. 661, 87 N. E. 1126 (1908).
156 Scott & Co., Inc. v. Scott, 186 App. Div. 518, 526, 174 N. Y. Supp. 583

(lst Dept. 1919).
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brought in as a party defendant,157 but, as the court said,
"the difficulty with suspending the trial of the action and
directing the plaintiff to bring in the present owner of the
property, is that the ownership may continually change to
bona fide grantees, and hence the court would never be able
to render a judgment of abatement of the nuisance. Of
course, irrespective of the court on its own motion directing
a person interested to be brought in as a party, the plaintiff
has the right to bring in the present owner and make him a
party to the litigation and attempt to obtain judgment while
he is still such owner. The plaintiff having a right of action
for damages against each owner for the period for which he
may maintain the nuisance, her most practical remedy would
seem to be to bring such several actions and recover her damages, until such time as she shall be fortunate enough to
find a defendant who still retains title to the property and
upon whom a judgment of abatement can operate. It may
be said that this is a hardship and puts her to much litigation to maintain her rights, but that is her misfortune, and
it is better that she should be put to this hardship than that
the court should be compelled to hold the action continually
and retry it against new parties and never be able to render
an effectual judgment."
The plaintiff in the foregoing action had filed a notice
of pendency of action against the property, but on motion of
the defendant it was cancelled, the court holding that the
land described in the notice was the land adjoining the street
whereon the encroachment was erected and that such land
"is in no manner affected by the suit".158
A prescriptive right to maintain and continue an encroachment as against an adjoining owner or one who has
been specially injured thereby, may be acquired by a continuous user for fifteen years 159 (formerly twenty years),160
15 Ackerman v. True, 102 App. Div. 172, 105 N. Y. Supp. 12 (1st Dept.
1907); Burrow v. Marceau, 132 App. Div. 797, 117 N. Y. Supp. 537 (1st Dept.
1909).
158 Ackerman v. True, 44 App. Div. 106, 60 N. Y. Supp. 608 (1st Dept.
1899) ; see McManus v. Weinstein, 108 App. Div. 301, 95 N. Y. Supp. 724 (1st
Dept. 1905) ; Fox v. T. E. Realty Co., Inc., 218 App. Div. 744 (2d Dept. 1926).
159 Klin Co. v. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 271 N. Y. 376, 3 N. E. (2d) 516

(1936).
160

Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568 (1876) ; Galway v. M. E. R. R., 128
N. Y. 132, 18 N. E. 479 (1891) ; Woodruff v. Paddock, 130 N. Y. 618, 29 N. E.
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provided, however, that there were no disabilities at the time

the statute began to run.

VII.

MARKETABILITY OF TiTLE.

When we come to a consideration of the marketability
of the title to real property where the building or some part
thereof encroaches upon the street, we find considerable confusion and many conflicting decisions. This is entirely attributalle to the rapid growth of the country, particularly
in the cities, and to the changed attitude of the municipal
authorities in requiring the removal of encroachments in
congested areas.
Until a comparatively recent period, the usual and common encroachments upon streets were considered to be too
trivial to warrant the rejection of a title, and unless the main
front wall of a building encroached more than one inch upon
a street a purchaser would be compelled to accept the title.
Titles were held to be marketable if the encroachment was
not too serious,18 1 or if it was erected under a license from
the public authorities, 162 or if the encroachment was merely
ornamental and not an integral part of the main structure, 16 3
or if the probabilities were such that there was little likelihood of the public authorities ordering the removal of the
1021 (1892) ; Lewis v. N. Y. & H. R. R., 162 N. Y. 202, 56 N. E. 540 (1900) ;
Ackerman v. True, 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903) ; Hindley v. M. R. R.,
185 N. Y. 335, 78 N. E. 276 (1906) ; Scallon v. Manhattan Ry., 185 N. Y. 359,
78 N. E. 284 (1906); Rupprecht v. St. Mary's R. C. C. Soc., 131 App. Div. 564,
115 N. Y. Supp. 926 (4th Dept. 1909), aff'd, 198 N. Y. 576, 92 N. E. 1101
(1910); Goldstrom v. Interboro R. T. Co., 115 App. Div. 323, 100 N. Y. Supp.
911 (1st Dept. 1906) ; People ex rel. Cross Co. v. Ahearn, 124 App. Div. 840,
109 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1st Dept. 1908) ; 556-8-5th Ave. Co. v. Lotus Club, 129
App. Div. 339, 113 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dept. 1908) ; Lambert v. Huber, 22
Misc. 462, 50 N. Y. Supp. 793 (1906).
161 Webster v. Kings Co. Tr. Co., 145 N. Y. 275, 39 N. E. 964 (1895);
Katz v. Kaiser, 10 App. Div. 137, 41 N. Y. Supp. 776 (1st Dept. 1896), aff'd,
154 N. Y. 294, 48 N. E. 532 (1897); 556-8-5th Ave. Co. v. Lotus Club, 129
App. Div. 339, 113 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dept. 1908).
162 Broadbelt v. Loew, 15 App. Div. 343, 44 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dept.
1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y. 642, 57 N. E. 1105 (1900).
163 Empire Realty Co. v. Sayre, 107 App. Div. 415, 95 N. Y. Supp. 371
(lst Dept. 1905) ; Van Horn v. Stuyvesant, 50 Misc. 432, 100 N. Y. Supp. 547

(1906).
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encroachment,16 4 or if the encroachment was patent and
visible upon an inspection of the property. 1 5
Because of the assumed power of municipal authorities
to license encroachments and the liberal policy of the courts
in holding such titles marketable, it is not difficult to understand why so many of the buildings erected in the past encroach to some extent upon the street. It was the common
and accepted practice, in drawing building plans, to place
ornamental projections, pillars, entrances, stoops and other
minor encroachments beyond the building line. Justification for this may be found in the fact that some of the city
ordinances permitted such an appropriation of the streets,
and little, if any, attention was paid to the fact that the city
could, at any time, order the removal of such encroachments.
It is small wonder, therefore, that encroachments upon city
streets are universal, and that buildings which do not encroach to some extent are the exception.
In order to understand the evolution of the law and to
measure the extent of the complete reversal of thought upon
the subject, it is necessary to examine some of the earlier
decisions.
A projection of a water table, which was not a part of
the wall of the building, and could be easily removed, but
which extended seven inches into the street, was deemed to
be such a minor encroachment as not to relieve a purchaser
from taking title, the encroachment having existed for thirtyeight years. 66 Where the main wall of a building was erected on the building line but the foundation of the water table
encroached five inches and the door posts encroached one foot
and three inches over the building line, the title was held
marketable.16 7 A title was held marketable where the stone
piers supporting a building were channeled longitudinally
at regular intervals for a depth of about two inches with the
164 Levy v. Hill, 70 App. Div. 95, 75 N. Y. Supp. 19 (lst Dept. 1902),
aff'd, 174 N. Y. 536, 66 N. E. 1112 (1903) ; 556-8--5th Ave. Co. v. Lotus Club,
129 App. Div. 339, 113 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dept. 1908) ; Ebert v. Hanneman,
69 Misc. 223, 125 N. Y. Supp. 237 (1910), aff'd, 142 App. Div. 898, 126 N. Y.
Supp. 1127 (2d Dept. 1910).
165 Webster v. Kings Co. Tr. Co., 145 N. Y. 275, 39 N. E. 964 (1895).
166 556-5th Ave. Co. v. Lotus Club, 129 App. Div. 339, 113 N. Y. Supp.
886 (1st Dept. 1908).
167 Webster v. Kings Co. Tr. Co., 145 N. Y. 275, 39 N. E. 964 (1895).
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result that while the inner surfaces of the channels were on
the street line, the remainder of the stone work, the superficial area of which was greater than that of the channels,
projected over the street line two inches. As this encroachment was within the stoop line and did not bear any part of
the weight of the building, it was deemed immaterial. 16 8 An
encroachment by a newel post and the lower step of a stoop
for about four inches was considered too small to warrant
rejection of a title," 9 and the fact that show windows ento seventeen inches was likewise concroached from sixteen
70
sidered immaterial.
Where the stoop of a building encroached fifteen feet
upon the street and had been so maintained without molestation for thirty years, a purchaser was required to take the
title,' 7' and even a substantial encroachment by a bay window of seven and one-half inches and by a stoop of six to
seven feet was held not to be a good objection to a title, the
city having, by ordinance, authorized the same. 7 2 In the
latter case, the court predicated its decision on the fact that '
"the so-called obstructions are not of such a character as to
constitute a public nuisance affecting a private right. In
view of the ordinances of the common council of the city of
New York and of the acquiescence of the authorities of the
city in the allowance of constructions such as those connected with the plaintiff's houses, the possibility of the owner
ever being molested is so exceedingly remote that the objections become technical only and not substantial."
An encroachment of one-half an inch over the street line
was held to be immaterial, 173 but an encroachment of the
front wall of from two and one-half to three and one-half
inches made the title unmarketable on the theory that "the'
vendee is entitled to receive title to the land with four walls
to the house and these should stand on the land conveyed,
168 Empire Realty Co. v. Sayre, 107 App. Div. 415, 95 N. Y. Supp. 371

(1st Dept. 1905).

169 Van Horn v. Stuyvesant, 50 Misc. 432, 100 N. Y. Supp. 547 (1906).
170 VoIz v. Steiner, 67 App. Div. 504, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1006 (1st Dept. 1902).
'17 Levy v. Hill, 70 App. Div. 95, 75 N. Y. Supp. 19 (1st Dept. 1902), aff'd,

174 N. Y. 536, 66 N. E. 1112 (1903).

172 Broadbelt v. Loew, 15 App. Div. 343, 44 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dept.
1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y. 642, 57 N. E. 1105 (1900).
173 Katz v. Kaiser, 10 App. Div. 137, 41 N. Y. Supp. 776 (1st Dept. 1896),
aff'd, 154 N. Y. 294, 48 N. E. 532 (1897).
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that the purchaser may acquire an unimpeachable title to
all." 174 In a case where the contracting parties agreed that
the purchaser should take the title if a bay window did not
encroach more than twelve inches and the survey subsequently disclosed that it encroached
two feet, the purchaser
1 5
was relieved from his contract.

7

The era during which the courts were extremely lenient
with respect to street encroachments came to an end about
forty years ago, and may be said to have culminated with the
Court of Appeals' decisions in Wormser v. Broum 176 in 1896,
and Broadbelt v. Loew "I in 1900. The rapid growth of the
cities, and the congestion of the population in certain sections, required the full width of the streets for public travel
and transportation. About this time also the city of New
York took cognizance of these conditions, and demanded the
removal of unlawful encroachments in those areas where the
public travel was heavy. In the light of these changing conditions, the courts re-examined the problem anew.
The first rift occurred in 1897 when Presiding Justice
Van Brunt, in the Appellate Division, registered his dissent
in the specific performance action of Broadbelt v. Loew,178
and although the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, it
is not law today. With the advent of Ackerman v. True 179
in 1903, and City of N. Y. v. Rice 180 in 1910, the courts became less tolerant of street encroachments, and new rules of
law were laid down which clarified the rights and limitations
of abutting owners with respect to the erection and maintenance of encroachments and the rights of municipalities to
license and permit them. In the Ackerman case, an adjoining owner succeeded in compelling the removal of an encroaching bay window which injured his property, and in
174 Smithers v. Steiner, 13 Misc. 517, 518, 34 N. Y. Supp. 678 (1895) ; see
Klim v. Sachs, 102 App. Div. 44, 92 N. Y. Supp. 107 (2d Dept. 1905).
175 Heymann v. Steich, 134 App. Div. 176, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1113 (2d Dept.
1909), aft'd, 201 N. Y. 578, 95 N. E. 1130 (1911).
176 149 N. Y. 163, 43 N. E. 524 (1896).
177 15 App. Div. 343, 44 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dept. 1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y.
642, 57 N. E. 1105 (1900).
178 15 App. Div. 343, 44 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dept. 1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y.
642, 57 N. E. 1105 (1900).
179 175 N. Y. 353, 67 N. E. 629 (1903).
180 198 N. Y. 124, 91 N. E. 283 (1910).
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the Rice case, the defendant was required to remove an ornamental projection in the street.
These decisions, which denied the right of abutting owners to erect and maintain unlawful encroachments, even
though they were ornamental, and which refused to recognize the assumed power of municipalities to legalize such
encroachments, did not involve the question of the marketability of the titles to such properties. For some time thereafter, the law as to the marketability of titles, where the
buildings or some part thereof encroached upon the street,
was in doubt. There was no question as to the marketability
of a title where the front wall of a building encroached more
than one inch upon a street, as the previous decisions had
resolved that problem, but there remained considerable doubt
as to whether a title was marketable where bay windows
which were not a part of the front wall, columns, entrances
and other ornamental projections encroached upon the street.
The courts found it difficult to abandon the old theory, so
often laid down in the earlier cases, that unsubstantial or
ornamental encroachments were not grounds for rejecting a
title, even though the municipality may step in at any time
and require their removal. A distinction was made between
the right of the city to compel the removal of encroachments,
and the right of a purchaser to reject a title because of encroachments. While the right of the city to remove encroachments was recognized, the courts were loath to permit a
purchaser to reject a title where the ornamental parts of a
building or the bay windows encroached upon a street.
It is sometimes difficult to break away from outmoded
precedents, even though new concepts of thought and social
changes disclose the fallacious reasoning upon which such
precedents are based. It is, therefore, not surprising to find
the Appellate Division in 1910 holding that a bay window,
which was not a part of the front wall of the building but
was attached thereto beginning two and one-half feet from
the ground and extending two feet five and one-half inches
into the street, would not make the title unmarketable, because it was built within the stoop line and the city had acquiesced in its maintenance for fifteen years.38s
181 Ebert v. Hanneman, 69 Misc. 223, 125 N. Y. Supp. 237 (1910), aff'd,
142 App. Div. 898 (2d Dept. 1910).
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In 1916, the Appellate Division held that the following
street encroachments did not affect the marketability of the
title: coping, five feet; two stoops, six feet each; cornice at
roof, one foot two inches to four feet; stone at entrance,
nine and one-half inches; stone over entrance, one foot one
and one-half inches; window sills, one and one-quarter inches
to three and one-half inches; window frames, two inches;
ornamental stone about windows, three inches to seven
inches; brick at side of entrance, eight inches; two stone
ledges, eight inches to sixteen inches; stone balcony, two feet;
and other minor encroachments. The opinion states that
these encroachments were "not shown to be integral parts
of the structure and presumptively they may be removed
without seriously affecting the buildings", and that they
"were manifestly visible to the naked eye". 1 82
The encroachment by show windows, stoop, areas and
steps in excess of those permitted by a city ordinance was
held, in 1917, not to affect the marketability of a title. 8 3 As
late as 1922, it was held that four bay windows constructed
of wood, two of them being on the second story and two on
the third story, which encroached one and one-half feet, did
not affect the validity of the title, the court saying: "The
bay windows could easily be removed, remodelled and replaced flush with the south front of the building at an expense of $300." Although the court conceded that "the
municipality has no power to grant an exclusive privilege
of a permanent encroachment upon a highway" and that "an
ordinance granting such a privilege would be void", the.fact
that the windows were twelve feet above the street level did
not interfere with the public use of the highway. Additional
reasons for holding the title marketable were (1) "the premises are more than a mile from the business center of Buffalo", (2) "the likelihood of interference with the bay windows is very remote", (3) "the expense of reconstruction is
very slight", (4) "the encroachment is trivial", (5) "the
rental value is not affected" and (6) "the value of the prem182 Sheridan v. McLaughlin, 172 App. Div. 314, 158 N. Y. Supp. 406 (1st
Dept. 1916).
183 Celestial Realty Co., Inc. v. Childs, 100 Misc. 532, 166 N. Y. Supp. 921
(1917), rev'd on other grounds, 182 App. Div. 85, 169 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1st
Dept. 1918).
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ises has in no wise suffered". 8 4 Unfortunately, the court did
not indicate where it would draw the line. If the building
had been a half or a quarter of a mile from the centre of the
town, or if the bay windows were seven or eight feet above
the street level instead of twelve feet, or if they extended
into the street two or more feet instead of one and one-half
feet, would the court have decided differently?
A decision involving the title to the Oxford Theatre
Building in Brooklyn was rendered by the Appellate Division in 1932. Two balconies, two pilasters and a marquise
encroached upon the street, but the court decided that the
purchaser must take the title subject to the encroachments
with an abatement in the purchase price, or, in the alternative, a deposit or a surety bond to be put up by the seller for
the cost of removing the encroachments "in the event that
the defendant shall be required to remove the same". The
court also stated that the encroachments "can be removed at
an estimated cost of from $675 to $3700, without injury to
the theatre building and without affecting its interior, and
without a substantial loss in the fee or rental value of the
premises." 185

The first case to reach the Court of Appeals on the question of marketability of title after the decisions in the Ackerman case and the Rice case, was in 1914, the lower court having decided that encroachm'ents by a roof cornice of two and
one-half feet, by the sills of four inches, by a ledge of one
foot four inches, by the lintels of seven inches and by the
window cases of two inches, did not make the title unmarketable, saying: "It must first be noted that Ackerman v.
True and other cases where the city compelled the removal
of projections did not involve the question of the marketability of the title." This decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals without opinion,18 6 but an abatement from the
purchase price was allowed to the purchaser. It was tantamount to saying that although the city may require the re184 Gelman v. Herrmann, 118 Misc. 290, 291, 292, 193 N. Y. Supp. 174

(1922).

185 Schwartz v. Fox Met. Playhouses, Inc., 235 App. Div. 637 (2d Dept.
1932).
'ssLeerburger v. Watson, 75 Misc. 3, 134 N. Y. Supp. 818 (1911), aff'd,
157 App. Div. 915 (1st Dept. 1913), aff'd, 213 N. Y. 662, 107 N. E. 1080 (1914).
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moval of the encroachments at any time, a purchaser will
nevertheless be compelled to accept such a title and take his
chances in the event that the city should thereafter insist
upon their removal.
More substantial encroachments were involved in the
case of Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, decided by the Court
of Appeals in 1915.187 There the purchaser rejected the title
because of the following street encroachments: store front
windows, one foot; two oriel windows extending from the
bottom of the second story to the cornice at the roof, one
foot; one bay window extending from the basement to the
roof, one foot; one oriel window directly over the entrance
and extending from the bottom of the third story to the roof,
one foot; stoop extending fourteen feet along the face of the
building, four feet; portico, one foot. The Appellate Division had held that the projections of the bay windows, stoop,
portico and balcony rendered the title unmarketable. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision, recognized that there was "a decided difference of opinion as
to their [the encroachments'] legal effect upon the marketability of the title".
In explaining the departure from the rule laid down in
the earlier cases, the court said: "From time almost immemorial it had then been the municipal policy to acquiesce
in the practically universal custom of encroaching upon the
streets with various building projections. This policy had
its genesis in the infancy of the city and it had been continued without interruption. Although the population had
reached large proportions when the case of Broadbelt was
decided, it has since then multiplied in a constantly ascending ratio of rapidity. The growing density of population,
and the spread of business into districts that were formerly
devoted wholly to residential structures, have created many
perplexing problems in connection with the use of the streets
as public highways. It is familiar recent history that these
changed conditions have led to the compulsory removal of
building encroachments from areas, streets and blocks where
they had always before been permitted. When the late Mr.
187

154 App. Div. 397, 139 N. Y. Supp. 266 (1st Dept. 1913), aff'd, 215

N. Y. 495, 109 N. E. 577 (1915).
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Justice Patterson wrote the opinon in the case of Broadbelt,
there was nothing to indicate that there would ever be a
radical departure from the early policy of the city with reference to building encroachments on the streets. Since then
the change has become an accomplished fact, and its binding
force has been recognized in the latter judicial decisions.
* *

*

The projections on the plaintiff's building, some of

which have been found by the Appellate Division to be encroachments of substantial character upon the two streets
by which the premises are bounded, may not be public nuisances so long as they are sanctioned by the permissive ordinance and the permit of the building department, but they
may be converted into such nuisances at any moment when
the municipal authorities exercise the power to direct their
removal. When the case of Broadbelt v. Loew was decided
the exercise of that power was regarded as an extremely remote possibility. At the present time, in view of the changed
policy of the city, it is impossible for the courts to take that
view. We know that it has recently been exercised with
reference to many encroachments that once were considered
immune from municipal interference, and that the courts
have upheld the action of the public authorities. In these
circumstances it cannot be said that a vendor has a marketable title if his building encroaches upon the public street
to such an extent as to threaten a vendee with a substantial
loss in the fee and rental value of the premises and a burdensome expense in altering the building to meet the requirements of the law. A vendee has the right to a title that will
enable him to hold his land in peace, and to be reasonably
sure that no flaw or doubt will arise to affect its marketable
quality and value."
A circular bay window which encroached eighteen
inches at the corner, and five piers which encroached five
inches, together with other minor encroachments, were held,
in 1921, to make a title unmarketable. 8 In the same year,
an encroachment by the wall of a building of -two inches on
the street was held to justify the rejection of a title, the
court saying: "The rule formerly was that certain encroachments upon the city's streets could be disregarded upon the
188 Levy Corp. v. Dick,

116 Misc. 145, 190 N. Y. Supp. 238 (1921).
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theory that there was no likelihood that the city authorities
would disturb the encroaching owner in his possession."
After commenting upon the earlier decisions and the complete reversal of the law by the later cases, the court continued: "It apparently has yet to be decided whether any
encroachment of a front wall can be regarded as negligible,
no matter how small it may be. It is not clear how or where
a line, necessarily arbitrary, can be drawn. If the city officials having power in that regard should order the oivners
on a street to eliminate all encroachments and cut back to
the street line, could the owner of a building projecting upon
the street escape because his encroachment amounted only,
say, to an inch? And if he were to be permitted to encroach
to that extent, could an intending buyer from him feel safe
from further molestation? Legislative acts, or city ordinances, might be passed for the purpose of permitting the
continuance of encroachments, but at best they would be of
doubtful constitutionality." 189
A similar encroachment of two inches by the front wall
of a building was likewise held to be ground for rejecting
the title in a later unreported case, 190 and in 1930, the Court
of Appeals held a title to be unmarketable where the front
wall of a building encroached four inches upon the street. ° '
Where the store windows, cellar doors, steps, fire escapes,
cornices and pilasters of a building encroached upon the
street, the pilasters, four in number, encroaching five inches,
the title was held not to be marketable, although "the encroachmentA complained of appear to be common in the neighborhood in question and no action as yet has been taken by
the authorities toward requiring their removal. The failure
to do so does not preclude them, however, from enforcing the
law at any time. It cannot be said that the removal of these
encroachments would decrease the rental value of the premises and yet the testimony is that the cost of their removal
might exceed $3,000 which must be held to be burdensome.
Perlman v. Stellwagen, 115 Misc. 6, 7, 187 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1921).
190 Kohn v. Meyer, N. Y. L. J., April 22, 1925, p. 303, col. 3.
R v. Kott, 254 N. Y. 580, 173 N. E. 875 (1930).
191 Ravine Point Corp.
189
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So that it might be said that the enforced removal of same
might entail a decrease in fee value." 192
A decision by Cropsey, J., in 1923, held a title to be unmarketable where the stairway leading into the cellar, and
the steps and a stoop leading into the upper part of the house,
encroached upon the street, on the theory that "these are
encroachments upon the highway which will have to be removed whenever the city requires it. Dispensing with the
steps leading into the cellar will reduce the rental value of
the property. To make the changes necessary to remove the
obstructions would cost at last $600. * * * The obstructions
are substantial and the property cannot be used if they 'be
removed unless substitutes are furnished." 193
One of the latest decisions of the Court of Appeals on
the so-called minor encroachments was handed down in 1926
in the case of Jennings v. Baumann.19 4 That case was an
action for specific performance where the title was rejected
because of the following street encroachments: (1) fence,
four feet nine inches; (2) stoop, five feet; (3) cellar steps,
one foot ten inches; (4) bay window cornice, one foot nine
inches and bay window trim of from two to six inches. The
lower court held that the encroachment by the bay window
cornice and the bay window trim was governed by the Acme
Realty Company case. As to the encroachments in subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, which "do not wholly exclude the public
from the use of that portion of the street continuing upon
which they are located and that the public continued to have
a qualified but nevertheless substantial use of that portion
of the street which was included within the courtyards, and
that the encroachments are there pursuant to ordinances
which were authorized by the common council of the former
City of Brooklyn", the court nevertheless held that they were
of a substantial character and that the purchaser was not
required to take such a title.
A later case involved the title to a valuable parcel of
real estate in New York City. Eleven piers of limestone,
terra cotta and brick construction extended into the street
Kllimas v. Brumbach, 116 Misc. 299, 300, 190 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1921).
Jackson v. Rentrop, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 13, 1923, p. 542, col. 2.
194 214 App. Div. 361, 212 N. Y. Supp. 334 (2d Dept. 1925), aff'd, 243
N. Y. 532, 154 N. E. 593 (1926).
192

193
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from one and one-quarter inches up to five and three-eighths
inches. The seller offered to remove the encroachments, or,
in the alternative to pay the cost of removal, but the purchaser rejected the offer. The seller also contended that,
under the Building Code of Ordinances, columns, pilasters
and ornamental -projections erected purely for the enhancement of the beauty of a building may project beyond the
building line not more than two and one-half per cent of the
width of the street, but not more than eighteen inches in
any case, 19 5 and asserted that the encroachments were within
the boundaries prescribed by the Building Code, that the location of the property practically precluded the possibility
that the encroachments would ever have to be removed, and
that even if such action should be taken, the cost of removal
would not exceed $2,100 and would not involve serious rental
or fee damage. The purchaser estimated that the cost of
removing the encroachments would amount to $11,000. The
title was held to be unmarketable. In commenting upon the
seller's offer to remove the encroachments, the court said
that the purchaser "may not be compelled to accept a structure the architectural embellishments of which have been
materially altered and the appearance of which has been
substantially changed. The architecture and exterior attractiveness of a structure may, no doubt, affect the fee and
rental value of the premises to a great extent, and the change
proposed by the plaintiff to substitute for the present surface
of the piers and their architectural arrangement of limestone,
terra cotta and brick in pilaster effect, piers of stucco extending from the street to the roof would no doubt decrease
the rental value. This substitution cannot be forced upon
the defendant and his refusal to consent thereto is justified".
This decision was unanimously affirmed by the Court of
1 96
Appeals.
The case of Poetzsch v. Mayer 197 is not in conflict with
the foregoing decisions. In that case it was held that a
building which had encroached for more than fifty years upon
195 This, and similar provisions, are contained in the N. Y. ADmiNISTRATIVE
CODE

§ C 26-219.0.

196 Lencrif Realty Corp. v. Cappelen, N. Y. L. J., July 1, 1926, p. 1937,
col. 3, aff'd, 247 N. Y. 566, 161 N. E. 184 (1928).
197 115 Misc. 422, 189 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1921).
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a private alley could remain as long as the building stood;
that the encroachment could not be removed and that the
title was marketable. There was no encroachment, in that
case, upon a public highway or a city street.
The trend of the decisions is away from the former liberal policy and, in fact, is a complete reversal of the former
rules. Many of the minor, unsubstantial and ornamental
projections, which were formerly considered trivial, are now
sufficient to render a title unmarketable and to warrant its
rejection. The fact that the city does not own the fee of the
land in the street, but only has an easement therein, does not
alter the situation, so long as the street is used and maintained as a public highway. 198
In some of the cases, the question was raised as to the
right of a purchaser to reject a title where the encroachment
was apparent and visible. 199 It may be definitely stated,
however, that the visibility of an encroachment is not a determining factor. In one case, it was said: "The projections were visible, it is true, but they are of such a character
that nothing short of an engineer's survey of the premises
would determine whether they encroach upon the street", 20 0
and in another opinion, the court said: "I cannot find any
authority nor has one been cited to the effect that the exception in the contract would cover encroachments visible
upon inspection but not discoverable without a survey." 201
It has heretofore been shown that if a street or highway
has been created by prescription or user and there is no record of its boundary lines other than the line of occupation
of the buildings abutting the street, an apparent encroachment over the supposed line of the street may not, in fact,
be an actual encroachment. 20 1 In an action for the specific
performance of a contract it appeared that the building
198 Jennings v. Baumann, 214 App. Div. 361, 212 N. Y. Supp. 334 (2d
Dept. 1925), aff'd, 243 N. Y. 532, 154 N. E. 593 (1926); Levy Corp. v. Dick,
116 Misc. 145, 190 N. Y. Supp'. 238 (1921).
199 Webster v. Kings Co. Trust Co., 145 N. Y. 275, 39 N. E. 964 (1895);
Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 154 App. Div. 397, 139 N. Y. Supp. 266 (lst
Dept. 1913), aff'd, 215 N. Y. 495, 109 N. E. 577 (1915) ; Sheridan v. McLaughlin, 172 App. Div. 314, 158 N. Y. Supp. 406 (1st Dept. 1916) ; Klimas v. Brumbach, 116 Misc. 299, 190 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1921).
200 Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N. Y. 495, 506, 109 N. E. 577 (1915).
201 Klimas v. Brumbach, 116 Misc. 299, 301, 190 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1921).
202 See note 107, supra.
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seemed to encroach fifteen inches upon the street, but there
was no record of the location of the street line. The street
apparently came into existence almost simultaneously with
the erection of the abutting buildings, i.e., although there
was no actual street line, the property owners erected their
buildings on a line which they supposed was, or would be,
the street line. In this way, .the line of the street was given
what is called a practical location, and the municipality
thereafter acceded to this location by taking jurisdiction
over it in that form, thereby recognizing it asa street to the
extent that it was being used for travel. It was held that
there was no actual encroachment and that the title was
03
marketable.
When surveyors disagree as to the extent of an encroachment, or whether or not there is an encroachment, a purchaser will generally not be relieved from his contract unless
he can affirmatively show that there is an encroachment in
fact.2 0 4 Where, upon conflicting evidence, it was impossible
to determine whether or not a building encroached one inch
upon the street, the court said: "It was not established by
a preponderance of evidence, as a fact in the case, that there
was such an encroachment. The evidence of the surveyors
upon that subject creates such a conflict that it cannot be
said that the fact was established." 205
Vaults under the sidewalk and beyond the building line
are ordinarily not included in the usual descriptions which
bound the property by the sides of the street. In the case of
Leerburgerv. Watson.,206 one of the grounds for rejecting the
title was that the seller did not have title to the vaults. A
boiler room in the building had no exit to the street except
through the vaults which were clearly appurtenant to the
203 Freer v. Arnold, 123 Misc. 619, 205 N. Y. Supp. 801 (1924); see
McCutcheon v. Terminal Station Commission, 88 Misc. 148, 150 N. Y. Supp.
850 (1914), aff'd, 168 App. Div. 301, 154 N. Y. Supp. 711 (4th Dept. 1915),
aff'd, 217 N. Y. 127, 111 N. E. 661 (1916).
204 Merges v. Ringler, 34 App. Div. 415, 54 N. Y. Supp. 280 (1st Dept.
1898), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 701, 53 N. E. 1128 (1899); Broadbelt v. Loew, 15 App.
Div. 343, 44 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dept. 1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y. 642, 57 N. E.
1105 (1900); Sasserath v. Metzgar, 30 Abb. N. C. 407, 27 N. Y. Supp. 959

(1893).

205 Broadbelt v. Loew, 15 App. Div. 343, 44 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1st Dept.
1897), aff'd, 162 N. Y. 642, 57 N. E. 1105 (1900).
20675 Misc. 3, 134 N. Y. Supp. 818 (1911), aff'd, 157 App. Div. 915 (1st
Dept. 1913), aff'd, 213 N. Y. 662, 107 N. E. 1080 (1914).

NEW YORK LAW ON ENCROACHMENTS

1939]

57

building, but it was held that the seller was not required to
acquire title to the vaults where he had contracted to sell the
property by metes and bounds and the vaults were outside of
the bounds. "If the owners of the premises owned the vaults
I think they would pass as appurtenances, but, not owning
them and not having contracted to sell them, I fail to see
how the title he tenders can be rejected because the vaults
are not included." 207
To the same effect is Apperson Realty Corp. v. Stafford
Bros., Inc.,20 8 where, after the delivery of the deed, the grantee sued the grantor because no permit for the use of a vault
had been obtained by the grantor, and the grantee was compelled to obtain a permit for the use of the vault and to pay
the city's charges therefor. On a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, the causes of action based upon the contract
and the deed were held insufficient, but other causes of action in tort, which alleged misrepresentation, were sustained.
Where a purchaser has taken title to property and later
discovers that the building on the property encroaches upon
the street, he may maintain an action against his grantor
under the covenant against incumbrances contained in the
deed. 20 9 While a covenant against incumbrances is a contract of indemnity and a grantee cannot recover thereunder
until the incumbrance has been removed or paid, such rule
is limited to incumbrances in the nature of a money charge,
such as a mortgage, judgment or tax which may be discharged
by the payment of money. "Where, however, the incumbrance
is of such a permanent nature that it cannot be removed or
extinguished by payment of money such as an easement, restrictions, etc., the covenantee may bring his action immediately upon the breach and recover just compensation for the
real injury, and is not limited to mere nominal damages. The
measure of damages in such case is the depreciation in value
of the land by reason of the incumbrance." 210
207
20

Ibid.

s Apperson Realty Corp. v. Stafford Bros. Inc., N. Y. L. J., May 1, 1925,
aff'd, 213 App. Div. 856 (1st Dept. 1925).
209 Hansen v. Pattberg, 212 App. Div. 49, 206 N. Y. Supp. 866 (2d Dept.
1924) ; Gamorsil Realty Corp. v. Graef, 128 Misc. 596, 220 N. Y. Supp. 221
(1926) ; Fusilli v. Feld, 139 Misc. 170, 247 N. Y. Supp. 721 (1931).
210 Hansen v. Pattberg, 212 App. Div. 49, 51, 206 N. Y. Supp. 866 (2d
Dept. 1924) ; see Fusilli v. Feld, 139 Misc. 170, 247 N. Y. Supp. 721 (1931).
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Because of the changed views of the courts in ruling that
minor, commonplace encroachments, which had theretofore
not received serious consideration, will make a title unmarketable, the printed forms of contracts generally used in the
city of New York were changed so as to provide that the purchaser will take title to the property subject to encroachments of stoops, areas, cellar steps, trim and cornices, if any,
upon any street or highway.
While such a contract provision is a necessity in a city
where street encroachments are universal, particular care
should be exercised in drafting a contract, if reference is
made therein to a survey, as such a provision may conflict
with the printed portion of the contract. If, for example,
a written or typewritten provision in a contract should state
that the property is sold subject to any state of facts that a
survey may show provided that the same does not make the
title unmarketable, such a clause would undoubtedly conflict
with the printed clause above mentioned. While no such reported case has been found, it will probably be held that the
printed clause must give way to the written clause on the
theory that the written parts of a contract control over any
parts of the printed contract which are ambiguous or inconsistent therewith.

2

11

In 1928, a purchaser refused to take a title because of
encroachments on a street, although the contract stated that
he would take title "subject to encroachment of stoop, areas
and cellar steps or appurtenances thereto on street and subject also to any state of facts an accurate survey of said
premises may disclose that does not render the title unmarketable". Here there was no conflict between two separate
clauses, one printed and one written, but the purchaser contended that he was entitled to receive the property free from
street encroachments because they made the title unmarketable. It was held that the purchaser could not reject the
title because of the street encroachments, 2 12 but it is possible
211 Heyn v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 192 N. Y. 1, 84 N. E. 725 (1908) ; Dwane
v. Weill, 199 App. Div. 719, 192 N. Y. Supp. 393 (1st Dept. 1922), aff'd, 235
N. Y. 527, 137 N. E. 720 (1923) ; Fagan v. Ulrich, 166 App. Div. 342, 344,
152 N. Y. Supp. 37 (3d Dept. 1915) ; Matter of Davis, 147 Misc. 96, 263 N. Y.
Supp. 482 (1933).
212 401 East 72nd St. Realty Co., Inc. v. Ebling Realty Co., 222 App. Div.
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that a different rule will be applied where the contract contains two separate and inconsistent clauses, one printed, and
the other written into the contract.
In order to alleviate some of the hardships of property
owners whose buildings encroached upon the street, and to
remove the stigma of unmarketability from such properties,
the legislature enacted several statutes of limitation applicable to buildings in the county of New York and in the
old city of Brooklyn. The first measure, which affects buildings in the county of New York only, was adopted in 1896.
It provides that if the front or other exterior wall of any
building then standing in that county shall encroach not
more than four inches upon any street, or if a bay or oriel
window shall extend not more than twelve inches upon any
street, such wall or bay or oriel window shall not be removable unless the city shall commence an action for its removal
within one year after the passage of the Act.2 13 A similar
Act was passed in 1899, also applicable only to the county
of New York, which increased the extent of the encroachment by the front or other exterior wall from four inches to
ten inches, but did not change the extent of the encroachwhich was left at twelve
ment by a bay or oriel window,
2 14
inches as in the prior Act.
A like statute of limitations, applicable to the old city
of Brooklyn, was enacted in 1897, and provides that if the
front or other exterior wall of any building then standing
shall extend not more than four inches upon any street, such
wall shall not be removable unless the city shall commence
its removal within one year after the passage
an action for
215
of the Act.
Under these several statutes, if a building in the county
of New York was erected prior to May 25th, 1899, and its
front or other exterior wall encroaches not more than ten
inches upon a street, or a bay or oriel window encroaches
not more than twelve inches upon a street, it may be per388, 226 N. Y. Supp. 58 (1st Dept. 1928), aff'd, 248 N. Y. 545, 162 N. E. 518

(1928).
N. Y. Laws 1896, c. 610, effective May 13, 1896.
N. Y. Laws 1899, c. 646, effective May 25, 1899.
215 N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 473, effective May 17, 1897.
213

214
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mitted to remain; if a building in the old city of Brooklyn
was erected prior to May 17th, 1897, and the front or other
exterior wall thereof encroaches not more than four inches
upon a street, such wall may likewise be permitted to remain.
JOHN

L. FINCK.

